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Abstract
My dissertation devotes to the understanding of people’s interactions under uncertainty..
It contains four essays on Microeconomics with Incomplete Information.1
Chapter 1 focuses on the existence of rational bubbles in an Allen-Morris-Postlewaite
(1993) setting, and finds positive and negative results for bubbles in an asset market
featuring rational expectations equilibrium. An expected bubble is said to exist if it
is mutual knowledge that the price of the asset is higher than the expected dividend.
Similarly we call it a strong bubble if everyone knows that the price is higher than the
maximum possible dividend. Substituting common knowledge for mutual knowledge, I
develop the new concepts of a common expected bubble and a common strong bubble. In
a simple finite horizon model with asymmetric information and short sales constraints,
I show that the following results hold for any finite number of agents. First, under the
implicit assumption of perfect memory, common strong bubbles never exist in any rational
expectations equilibrium. Second, it is possible to have one that is both a strong bubble and
a common expected bubble in a rational expectations equilibrium. Based on these results,
this paper, as well as Conlon (2004) and many others, provides a partial answer to the
question: What properties do rational bubbles have in a rational expectations equilibrium?
In Chapter 2, I study the relationship between information improvement and welfare
outcomes in a finite-player finite-state model with incomplete information. In a context
1 Chapter 3 is based on joint work with John Conlon (University of Mississippi).
ii
of strategic interactions, it is possible that people may prefer to be ignorant rather than
knowledgeable. Three simple examples are studied carefully in order to provide economic
insight for this observation: if players were allowed to (not forced to) forget at no cost,
they might have incentives to do so in equilibrium, and their expected payoff could
actually be improved. In a general setting where players simultaneously choose whether
to forget or not before the state of the world is realized, I show that players’ actions would
reveal additional information and that their preferences must be negatively correlated, for
forgetfulness to be part of a possible equilibrium strategy. This finding indicates that in a
world of incomplete information, people may not be made better off by obtaining more
information, and they may even have incentive to be forgetful. These results will have
important applications in policy design.
Many economic models of rational bubbles are not very robust to perturbations.
The existence of bubbles in these models requires strong conditions to be satisfied. In
Chapter 3, we first study the bubble examples in the first Chapter and show that those
bubbles are robust to both strongly symmetric perturbations in beliefs and very symmetric
perturbations in dividends, but not robust to general perturbations. Then we construct a
new three-period two-agent robust bubble example where small variations in parameters
do not eliminate the bubble equilibria. The idea is that assuming continuum of states can
lead to a robust bubble equilibrium where each bad type of the seller pools with some good
type of the seller. This provides a new answer to the question: How robust can rational
bubbles be in a finite horizon model?
iii
Morris, Shin and Postlewaite (1993) show an upper bound of asset prices in Rational
Expectations Equilibrium. Chapter 4 is a note that strengthens their result by providing
a tighter upper bound and hence offers a better answer to the question: How large can a
bubble be in equilibrium?
iv
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Chapter 1 Strong Bubbles and Common Expected Bubbles in a Finite Horizon
Model
1.1 Introduction
Bubbles exist in many markets, not only those where assets have fundamental values
hard to determine or observe (stocks, for instance), but also some where assets have
fundamental values known to be less than their prices (fiat money, for instance). How can
bubbles be explained and what must be true for the existence of bubbles? Though claiming
that most bubbles are irrational is much easier than interpreting bubbles in a rational way,
economists have made and are still making efforts to deal with the latter.
Among the huge literature on the existence of bubbles, one strand has developed
models based on the existence of some irrational agents, often called noise traders in the
literature (see, for example, De Long, Shleifer, Summers and Waldmann (1990), Abreu
and Brunnermeier (2003), and Zurita (2004)). Papers in this strand interpret bubbles by
the interaction between the rational and the irrational.2
Another strand of the literature, has tried to model bubbles under the assumption that
all agents are rational.3 In such settings, an asset bubble can be explained either by the
assumption of an infinite horizon or by the infinite presence of new agents (see Tirole
(1982) and Tirole (1985) for example). However, in order to interpret the existence of a
2 Though the rational agents have incentive to take advantage of the irrational, it is possible that noise traders
may actually earn a higher expected return than rational investors do. For details, see De Long, Shleifer, et
al. (1990).
3 In fact it is assumed that the rationality of the agents is common knowledge in most papers of this strand.
Under the assumption of rational expectations, these two are equivalent.
1
finite horizon bubble4 in a rational expectations equilibrium with a finite number of agents,
either a change of standard assumptions (for instance, symmetric information) or the
introduction of specific requirements (for instance, short sales constraints) has to be made.
Thus the question becomes: What is the minimum requirement for the existence of such a
rational bubble?
By the well-known no-trade theorem of Milgrom and Stokey (1982), under the standard
setting, if the initial allocation is efficient relative to each agent’s belief, then the common
knowledge of feasibility of and voluntary participation in trade will give agents no
incentive to trade, no matter whether they have private information or not. If there is
no trade in a finite horizon economy, there is certainly no bubble. Hence the ex ante
inefficiency of the endowment allocation, or the existence of potential gains from trade, is
one necessary condition for such a bubble to exist.5
Allen, Morris and Postlewaite (1993) (AMP (1993) henceforth) define two types
of bubbles–expected bubbles and strong bubbles–in their finite-agent finite-horizon
finite-state trade model, and show that private information about the states and short sales
constraints for all agents are another two necessary conditions for the existence of strong
bubbles. An expected bubble is said to exist if it is mutual knowledge that the price of
the asset is higher than the expected dividend. They call it a strong bubble if everyone
knows that the price is higher than the maximum possible dividend. While the concept of
expected bubbles provides a starting point for analysis, economists are more interested in
4 Among all the bubble phenomena, finite horizon bubbles are probably most puzzling.
5 For a complete proof, see Tirole (1982).
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the concept of strong bubbles.
Combining these three together with a fourth requirement that the agents’ trade should
not be common knowledge, AMP (1993) presented an example of strong bubbles in
a rational expectations equilibrium with three agents and three periods.6 This model
captures the "greater fools" dynamic in the sense that because of asymmetric information,
agents may hold a worthless asset at a positive price in the first period (hence a strong
bubble), in hopes of selling it in the second period to someone else who thinks it may be
worth something. In short, a rational bubble can exist in this setting because even though
everyone knows that the asset is overpriced, they may still hold it with the belief that
others might think that it is valuable.
Given the success of the Allen, Morris and Postlewaite model, economists are somewhat
less than satisfied with the last assumption, the one requiring no common knowledge
of trades, since many bubbles do exist in reality with the public information of agents’
actions. Conlon (2004) constructed a strong bubble example in a similar setting7 where
there are only two agents. Since trades are automatically common knowledge for the
two-agent case, this result has questioned the necessity of the assumption of no common
knowledge of trades for the existence of a finite horizon bubble in a rational expectations
equilibrium. Another contribution of Conlon (2004) is that the bubble in the model is not
6 It has been shown in that paper that there is no expected bubble in the last two periods under their
framework, which will be described in Section 2; hence the minimum number of periods for the existence of
a bubble is 3.
7 The setting of Conlon (2004) differs from AMP (1993) in the sense that agents’ information structures are
determined both by the private signals they receive at the beginning of period 1 and by the public signals
they receive at the beginning of every period. The information structures are chosen so that prices reveal no
additional information.
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only strong but also robust to nth order knowledge, that is (all agents know that)n the price
is higher than any possible dividend agents will receive.
Based on the fact of the existence of nth order bubbles, one may naturally ask whether
a bubble can be robust to common knowledge. In this paper, by requiring common
knowledge instead of mutual knowledge, I develop two new concepts of bubbles: a
common expected bubble and a common strong bubble. A common expected bubble
is said to exist if it is common knowledge that the price of the asset is higher than the
expected dividend. A common strong bubble is said to exist if it is common knowledge
that the price of the asset is higher than the maximum possible dividend. The concept of
the common strong bubble is so "strong" that it can be shown never to exist in any rational
expectations equilibrium under the standard assumption of perfect memory. However, I am
able to show that within the same framework as the AMP (1993) model but with common
knowledge of trades, a strong bubble can exist in the case of two agents, and this bubble
can still exist even when it is common knowledge that the price is higher than the expected
dividend agents will receive (hence a common expected bubble). Moreover, such a bubble,
both a strong bubble and a common expected bubble, is robust to one class of symmetric
perturbations in beliefs and another class of symmetric perturbations in dividends, and can
exist for any finite number of agents.8 This positive result itself, on the one hand, weakens
the assumptions of the models of bubbles by reducing the four necessary conditions to
three, and hence improves these models’ applicability and powers in interpretation. On the
8 I assume that each agent is distinguished from the others in the sense that either their beliefs are
heterogeneous or their information structures are different, or both. Otherwise, this result would hold
trivially since each agent can be "divided" according to endowments into any finite number of subagents.
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other hand, the surprising result of the existence of common expected bubbles is somewhat
counterintuitive but captures the idea that agents do not rush in face of bubbles since,
given the common knowledge of the heterogeneous beliefs and the information structures,
they believe that they can take advantage of it in a later period. Another contribution of
this paper lies in the understanding of the structural characteristics of models of bubbles: I
show that a couple of structural conditions must be satisfied for a strong bubble to exist in
a rational expectations equilibrium in a 2-agent symmetric economy. One of them is that
the minimum number of states is 8.
The next section of the paper introduces the basic framework following AMP (1993),
gives four concepts of bubbles, and shows the nonexistence of common strong bubbles in
any rational expectations equilibrium. Section 3 presents a simple example of a rational
bubble with two agents; the bubble is both a strong bubble and a common expected bubble.
Section 4 characterizes necessary conditions about the number of states and the structure
of information partitions for the existence of strong bubbles and common expected
bubbles. Section 5 shows the general results for any finite number of agents. Section
6 offers another example where a second order strong bubble and a common expected
bubble can coexist in equilibrium. Section 7 provides concluding remarks and directions
for further study.
1.2 The Model
1.2.1 Basic Setup
The same framework is established here as in AMP (1993), except that the requirement
5
that the trades should not be common knowledge is removed.
In the pure exchange economy under study, there are I ( 2) risk neutral9 agents
(i = 1; 2;    ; I), T ( 3) periods (t = 1; 2;    ; T ) and N ( 2) states of the world
represented by ! 2 
. Only 2 assets exist in the market: one riskless (money) and the
other risky. There is no discount between any two periods. Each share of the risky asset
will only pay a state-dependent dividend denoted by d (!) at the end of period T .
Agent i is endowed with mi units of money and ei shares of the risky asset at
the beginning of period 1. In each period t and in each realized state !, agents
can exchange claims on the risky asset at a state-and-period-dependent price
Pt (!). Agent i’s net trade in period t when state ! is realized is denoted by
xit (!), and we write xi = (xi1; xi2;    ; xiT ), xt = (x1t; x2t;    ; xIt), and
x = (x1; x2;    ; xI). Hence agent i’s final consumption in state ! with net trades xi at
price P (!) = (P1 (!) ; P2 (!) ;    ; PT (!)), denoted by yi (!; P (!) ; xi), is equal to
mi + eiPT (!) +
TX
t=1
xit (!) [Pt+1 (!)  Pt (!)], where PT+1 (!) = d (!). Let ui () be
agent i’s utility function. Then agent i’s utility in state ! with net trades xi at price P (!),
is ui(yi (!; P (!) ; xi)). For simplicity, assume that ui () is the identity function for all i.
Each agent i has a subjective belief about the probability distribution of the state,
denoted by i (!).10 8i = 1; 2;    ; I;8! 2 
; i (!) > 0.
9 Agents are assumed to be either risk averse or risk neutral in AMP (1993). Here for simplicity, I only
consider the case of risk neutrality. All the results will remain valid for the risk averse case as long as the
potential gain from trade is high enough.
10 We may either assume same utility function with heterogeneous beliefs, or assume common prior with
different utility functions, in order to give agents an incentive to trade. Here we adopt the former one and in
the next version we may also consider the latter. For other approaches to induce trade, see AMP (1993) for
details.
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1.2.2 Information Structure
At the beginning of each period t, before observing the current price and making the
trade, agent i’s information about the state is represented by Sit, a partition of the space

, and his price–and-trade-refined information is represented by SPXit .11 We denote by
sit (!) (sPXit (!)) the partition member in Sit (SPXit ) containing the state !. In other words,
sit (!) consists of all the possible states agent i believes he might be in when the state !
is realized in period t. For example, si1 (!1) = f!1; !2g means that in period 1 agent i
believes he might be either in !1 or !2 when !1 is realized.
SPXit is determined by (Sit; Pt; xt) such that
8! 2 
; sPXit (!) = sit (!) \ f!0jPt0 (!0) = Pt0 (!) and xt0 (!0) = xt0 (!) 8t0  tg .
Obviously 8i = 1; 2;    ; I;8t = 1; 2;    ; T; 8! 2 
; f!g  sPXit (!)  sit (!).
We assume agents have perfect memory so that
8i = 1; 2;    ; I;8! 2 
;8t > t0; sit (!)  sit0 (!) .
Obviously this implies that
8i = 1; 2;    ; I;8! 2 
;8t > t0; sPXit (!)  sPXit0 (!) .
It should be noted that when agents make trades to optimize their payoffs, the
information they based on is sPXit (!) instead of Sit, since it is assumed that rational agents
11 In the AMP (1993) model, they only focus on the price-refined information SPit . In their model it is assumed
that the trades are not common knowledge and hence agents cannot get additional information from trades.
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should make use of all the information they can obtain. As we will see, the assumption of
perfect memory plays an important role in Proposition 1, which we will state at the end of
this section.
1.2.3 Rational Expectations Equilibrium
Before we come to the definition of a rational expectations equilibrium, in order to be
consistent with the AMP (1993) model, two concepts have to be introduced first.
Definition 1 (Information Feasibility) Agent i’s net trades xi are information feasible
if in each period t, xit is measurable with respect to player i’s price–and-trade-refined
information, SPXit . Formally, xi are information feasible if
8t = 1; 2;    ; T; 8! 2 
; sPXit (!)  f!0 : xit (!0) = xit (!)g .
The last part of the above expression is equivalent to 8!0; !00 2 sPXit (!) ; xit (!0) =
xit (!
00), which might capture more intuition than the one used in the definition. Basically,
information feasibility rules out the possibility of acting differently given the same
information.
Definition 2 (No Short Sales) Agent i’s net trades xi satisfy no short sales if in each pe-
riod t and in each state ! agent i’s holdings of the risky asset are non-negative. Formally,
xi satisfy no short sales if
8t = 1; 2;    ; T; 8! 2 
; ei +
tX
s=0
xit (!)  0.
As shown in AMP (1993), this no short sales condition is necessary for the existence
of a bubble in a rational expectations equilibrium. It should be noted that there is no
constraint on the short sales of money.
Denote by jt (!) the join of s1t (!) ; s2t (!) ;    ; sIt (!),12 and by mt (!) the meet of
12 The join jt (!) of s1t (!) ; s2t (!) ;    ; sIt (!) is such that (1) 8i = 1; 2;    ; I; jt (!)  sit (!) and (2) for
all j0t (!) satisfying (1), j0t (!)  jt (!). It is also called the coarsest common refinement.
8
s1t (!) ; s2t (!) ;    ; sIt (!).13
Now we are ready to give the definition of a Rational Expectations Equilibrium in this
pure exchange economy.
Definition 3 (Rational Expectations Equilibrium) (P; x) 2 RNT+ RINT is a Rational
Expectations Equilibrium if
(C1) 8i = 1; 2;    ; I , xi are information feasible and satisfy no short sales. Denote the
set of all such xi’s by Fi (ei; P; x i; Si), where Si = (Si1; Si2;    ; SiT );14
(C2) 8i = 1; 2;    ; I , xi 2 argmaxx0i2Fi(ei;P;x i;Si)
X
!2

i (!)ui(yi (!; P; x
0
i));
15
(C3) 8t = 1; 2;    ; T; 8! 2 
;
IX
i=1
xit (!) = 0;
(C4) 8t = 1; 2;    ; T; Pt () is measurable with respect to jt (!). Formally, 8t =
1; 2;    ; T; 8! 2 
; jt (!)  f!0 : Pt (!0) = Pt (!)g.
Basically, (C1) describes the feasible set of trade for each agent, (C2) says that each
agent maximizes his expected utility given his price-and-trade-refined information,
(C3) requires that the market should clear in equilibrium, and (C4) implies that all the
information contained in price is from the join of the individual information.
1.2.4 Different Concepts of Bubbles
Different definitions of bubbles will lead to different results even within the same
framework. As a base line, we use the concept of an expected bubble, defined in AMP
(1993). As we will see, the stronger the concept of a bubble become, the harder for it to
13 The meet mt (!) of s1t (!) ; s2t (!) ;    ; sIt (!) is such that (1) 8i = 1; 2;    ; I; sit (!)  mit (!) and
(2) for allm0t (!) satisfying (1),mt (!)  m0t (!). It is also called the finest common coarsening.
14 Since 8xi 2 Fi, xi are information feasible, Fi depends on the information structure Si, the prices P , and
other agents’ trades x i. Since xi satisfy no short sales, Fi depends on the endowment ei. That’s why it is
written as Fi (ei; P; x i; Si).
15 Another perhaps more intuitive way to express (C2) is (C2’) 8i = 1; 2;    ; I , xi 2 argmaxx0i2Fi(ei;P;x i;Si)
Ei

ui (yi (!; P; x
0
i)) jSPXi1

. It is easy to see that (C2’) is equivalent to (C2).
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exist in equilibrium.
Definition 4 (Expected Bubble) As in AMP (1993), an expected bubble is said to exist in
state ! in period t if in state ! it is mutual knowledge that the price of the risky asset in
period t is higher than the expected dividend an agent will receive, that is
8i = 1; 2;    ; I; Pt (!) > 1X
!02sPXit (!)
i (!0)
X
!02sPXit (!)
i (!
0) d (!0) .
Definition 5 (Strong Bubble) As in AMP (1993), a strong bubble is said to exist in state
! in period t if in state ! it is mutual knowledge that the price of the risky asset in period t
is higher than the maximum possible dividend an agent will receive, that is
8i = 1; 2;    ; I;8!0 2 sPXit (!) ; Pt (!) > d (!0) .
As seen from above, the concept of strong bubbles strengthens the concept of expected
bubbles in a way that it requires that the asset price be higher than the maximum possible
dividend, not just the expected dividend. As will be seen below, another way to strengthen
the concept of expected bubbles is to require common knowledge instead of mutual
knowledge. This requirement is reasonable since in the real world people’s behaviors do
not only depend on their own beliefs, but also depend on others’ beliefs, others’ beliefs on
their own beliefs, and so on. Therefore, we might expect to see something different when
common knowledge is introduced into the concept of bubbles.
Definition 6 (Common Expected Bubble) A common expected bubble is said to exist in
state ! in period t if in state ! it is common knowledge that the price of the risky asset in
period t is higher than the expected dividend an agent will receive, that is
8i = 1; 2;    ; I;8!0 2 mPXt (!) ; Pt (!) >
1X
!002sPXit (!0)
i (!00)
X
!002sPXit (!0)
i (!
00) d (!00) .16
.
Definition 7 (Common Strong Bubble) A common strong bubble is said to exist in state
! in period t if in state ! it is common knowledge that the price of the risky asset in period
16 mPXt (!) is the meet of sPX1t (!) ; sPX2t (!) ;    ; sPXIt (!).
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t is higher than the maximum possible dividend an agent will receive, that is
8!0 2 mPXt (!) ; Pt (!) > d (!0) .
1.2.5 Nonexistence of Common Strong Bubbles in Equilibrium
Among the 4 definitions above, clearly the common strong bubble is the strongest one.
One may wonder if there exists such a bubble in a rational expectations equilibrium. The
answer is NO, due to the following proposition. This nonexistence result is actually an
immediate implication from Corollary 4.1 in Morris-Postlewaite-Shin (1995). Here we
adopt a different approach to proof.
Proposition 1 Under the perfect memory assumption, 8! 2 
;8t = 1; 2;    ; T;it is
impossible for a common strong bubble to exist in state ! in period t in any rational expec-
tations equilibrium.
Proof. Suppose it is possible and 9!;9t such that a common strong bubble exists
in state ! in period t in a rational expectations equilibrium. Then mPXt (!) is the
set of states where there is common knowledge among agents when ! is realized.
Thus we have 8!0 2 mPXt (!) ; Pt (!) = Pt (!0) > d (!0). By the feature of rational
expectations equilibrium, there must exist some agent i for whom buying is at least as
good as selling, which implies that Pt (!)  Ei

Pt+1 (!
0) j!0 2 sPXit (!)

. Therefore,
Pt (!)  maximax!02sPXit (!) Pt+1 (!0)  max!02mPXt (!) Pt+1 (!0). Since agents have
perfect memory, we have 8i = 1; 2;    ; I; sPXi(t+1) (!)  sPXit (!), which implies
mPXt+1 (!)  mPXt (!). By induction we have Pt (!)  max!02mPXt (!) PT+1 (!0) =
max!02mPXt (!) d (!
0). Thus 9! 2 mPXt (!) such that d (!)  Pt (!), which causes a
contradiction.
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The intuition behind the nonexistence of common strong bubbles is that if it is common
knowledge that the price today is higher than the highest dividend agents may receive, then
agents might be better off by selling the asset instead of holding it, no matter what kind
of heterogeneous beliefs they may have. Since everyone wants to sell, there cannot be a
rational expectations equilibrium any more. It is worth noting that the result of Proposition
1 is independent of the assumption of common knowledge of trades. In the case of no
common knowledge of trades, the result is still true. The only modification needed is
replacing the price–and-trade-refined information by the price-refined information. It
is also worth noting that the result of Proposition 1 crucially depends on the perfect
memory assumption. If we allow for agents to forget some information they knew
before, a common strong bubble may exist in a rational expectations equilibrium. Such a
counterexample is presented in Section 6.
Though under the standard assumption of perfect memory there is no common strong
bubble in any rational expectations equilibrium, an expected bubble, which is both strong
and common expected, can exist in a rational expectations equilibrium of a three-period
two-agent economy, as will be shown in the next section.
1.3 A Simple Example: Strong Bubbles and Common Expected Bubbles with Two
Agents
1.3.1 Exogenous Setting
AMP (1993) has constructed a strong bubble in a rational expectations equilibrium of
a three-period three-agent economy with the assumption of no common knowledge of
trades. In this section, I will provide a simple example of the existence of strong bubbles
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with two agents where trades become automatically common knowledge. Moreover, as
will be shown, the bubble in the example will also be robust to common knowledge in the
expected sense, hence a common expected bubble.
There are 2 agents (A and B), 3 periods (1, 2, and 3) and 8 states (!1, !2, !3, !4, !5,
!6, !7 and !8). Only 2 assets exist in the market: one is money and the other is called
a risky asset. Each share of the risky asset will pay a dividend of amount 4 at the end of
period 3 if the state is either !1 or !4, and will pay nothing otherwise, as shown in the
table below.
Table 1:1 Dividend Distribution Accross States
State !1 !2 !3 !4 !5 !6 !7 !8
d (!) 4 0 0 4 0 0 0 0
Each agent is endowed with mi unit of money and 1 share of the risky asset at the
beginning of period 1. Agents can trade in each of period 1, 2, and 3. In period 3, after the
trade is made, the dividend is realized, and then the consumption takes place.
Keeping in mind that the asymmetric information is the key to generating strong
bubbles, we achieve this goal by giving agents different information structures. Remind
that agent i’s (i = A;B) information about the state in period t (t = 1; 2; 3) is represented
by Sit, a partition of the space 
. The specific structures of Sit’s are given by
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SA1 = ff!1; !2; !3; !4; !5; !8g ; f!6; !7gg
SB1 = ff!1; !2; !4; !5; !6; !8g ; f!3; !7gg
SA2 = ff!1; !2; !3g ; f!4; !5g ; f!6; !7g ; f!8gg
SB2 = ff!4; !5; !6g ; f!1; !2g ; f!3; !7g ; f!8gg
SA3 = SB3 = ff!1g ; f!2g ; f!3g ; f!4g ; f!5g ; f!6g ; f!7g ; f!8gg .
At first glance, this particular structure of information may seem complicated, but
as our analysis goes on, the reason why it is set in this form will become clear. So
far, there are at least three observations. First, in period 3, each agent is perfectly
informed of what the realized state is and hence there is no asymmetric information
then. Second, in period 2, agent A receives more information only when he observed
f!1; !2; !3; !4; !5; !8g in period 1, and agent B receives more information only when he
observed f!1; !2; !4; !5; !6; !8g in period 1. Third, in period 1, if the state !7 is realized,
each agent knows that he will receive no dividend for sure.17 Hence if the price is positive
in period t = 1 in state ! = !7, there will be a strong bubble, and that is part of what we
are going for. The state where there is a strong bubble is called a bubble state.
There are different approaches to generate potential gains from trade. Instead of
assuming different marginal utility levels across the states, here we let agents have
heterogeneous beliefs, as shown in the table below with weight W = 1
16
.
17 Take agent A into consideration for example. When !7 is realized, agent A will have observed the event
f!6; !7g. Since in either state !6 or !7, there is no dividend payment, agent A knows that he will receive
no dividend with probability 1.
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Table 1:2 Agents’ Beliefs Accross States
State !1 !2 !3 !4 !5 !6 !7 !8
A 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 7
B 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 7
Also, the structure of the beliefs may seem complicated for now, but it will become
clear why it serves for the existence of a bubble in a rational expectation equilibrium. So
far, it is easy to observe that within the two states where there will be a dividend of 4,
agent A puts a higher weight on state !1, and agent B puts a higher weight on state !4.
They put the same weight on state !7, and state !8, respectively. The weights they put on
events f!1; !2; !3g and f!4; !5; !6g are also symmetric.
1.3.2 A Rational Expectations Equilibrium with a Bubble
Recall the standard definition given in the last section, and in our example a rational
expectations equilibrium will be a vector (P; x) 2 R38+ R238 such that
(C1) 8i = A;B, net trades xi are information feasible and satisfy no short sales;
(C2) 8i = A;B, xi maximize player i’s expected payoff with respect to his own
price-and-trade-refined information;
(C3) 8t = 1; 2; 3;8n = 1;    ; 8; xAt (!n) + xBt (!n) = 0;
(C4) 8t = 1; 2; 3;8n;m = 1;    ; 8; jt (!n)  f!m : Pt (!m) = Pt (!n)g.
Although there are multiple rational expectations equilibria for this example, the one
with the equilibrium prices and trades given in the following two tables is what we are
interested in - the one in which there is a strong bubble and a common expected bubble.
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Table 1:3 Equilibrium Prices
State !1 !2 !3 !4 !5 !6 !7 !8
P1 (!) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
P2 (!) 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 0
P3 (!) 4 0 0 4 0 0 0 0
Table 1:4 Equilibrium Net Trades
8! 2 
; xA1 (!) = xB1 (!) = xA3 (!) = xB3 (!) = 0
State !1 !2 !3 !4 !5 !6 !7 !8
xA2 (!) 1 1 1  1  1  1 0 0
xB2 (!)  1  1  1 1 1 1 0 0
xA2 (!) + xB2 (!) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1.3.2.1 Price-and-Trade-Refined Information
First, derive the price–and-trade-refined information for each agent in each period.
It is easy to observe from the price table that P1 (!) = 1 8! 2 
 and from the trade
table that xA1 (!) = xB1 (!) = 0 8! 2 
. This implies that the prices and trades in
period 1 reveal no information. Hence SPXA1 = SA1, SPXB1 = SB1. Since in period 3,
all agents already have full information about the state before observing the prices and
making the trades,18 the prices and trades in period 3 again, reveal no information. Hence
SPXA3 = SA3, S
PX
B3 = SB3. The only new information revealed by prices and trades in
period 2 is that agents know where they are for sure when the state !7 is realized. Hence
agents’ price–and-trade-refined information in period 2 is the following, with the original
18 Actually there is no trade in period 3 in the equilibrium under study.
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information structure attached below for comparison.
SPXA2 = ff!1; !2; !3g ; f!4; !5g ; f!6g ; f!7g ; f!8gg
SPXB2 = ff!4; !5; !6g ; f!1; !2g ; f!3g ; f!7g ; f!8gg
SA2 = ff!1; !2; !3g ; f!4; !5g ; f!6; !7g ; f!8gg
SB2 = ff!4; !5; !6g ; f!1; !2g ; f!3; !7g ; f!8gg .
The following graph may give more intuition about the information structure than the
mathematical expression does. In the graph, agent A’s information sets are described by
the black solid curves; agent B’s information sets are described by the blue dotted curves;
dividend paying states are emphasized in gray color.
Figure 1:1: 3-Period Information Structure for Agent A and Agent B
It is worth noting that in period 2, with the price-and-trade-refined information, agent
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A is better informed than agent B when event f!4; !5; !6g happens, and agent B is
better informed than agent A when event f!1; !2; !3g happens. We will see soon that
the subgroup of states f!4; !5; !6g is where agent A takes advantage of agent B by
selling the asset he believes is overpriced to agent B, and similarly, the subgroup of states
f!1; !2; !3g is where agent B takes advantage of agent A.
1.3.2.2 The Existence of Strong Bubbles and Common Expected Bubbles
Second, note that there is a strong bubble in period 1 in state !7 since for agent
A, sPXA1 (!7) = f!6; !7g, P1 (!7) = 1 > 0 = d (!6) = d (!7), and for agent B,
sPXB1 (!7) = f!3; !7g, P1 (!7) = 1 > 0 = d (!3) = d (!7). In short, a strong bubble exists
in period 1 in !7 because in that state every agent knows the asset is worthless but with a
positive current price.
In this example, mPX1 (!7) = 
. To see that this bubble is robust to common
knowledge in the expected sense, we need to check that 8i = A;B;8! 2 
; 1 >
1P
!02sPX
i1
(!)
i(!0)
P
!02sPXi1 (!) i (!
0) d (!0). There are four cases:
(1)! = !7: Agent A observes the event f!6; !7g, and agent B observes the event
f!3; !7g. Each of them will deduce that the expected dividend in period 3 will be
1
2
0 + 1
2
0 = 0, which is less than the current price.
(2)! = !6: Agent A observes the event f!6; !7g, and his expected dividend in period
3 is 0, less than the current price. Agent B observes 
n f!3; !7g, and his expected
dividend in period 3 is 3
14
4 + 11
14
0 = 6
7
, less than the current price.
(3)! = !3: Agent B observes the event f!3; !7g, and his expected dividend in period
3 is 0, less than the current price. Agent A observes 
n f!6; !7g, and his expected
dividend in period 3 is 3
14
4 + 11
14
0 = 6
7
, less than the current price.
(4)!n 2 
n f!3; !6; !7g, Agent A observes the event 
n f!6; !7g, and agent B observes
the event 
n f!3; !7g. Each of them will deduce that the expected dividend in period
3 will be 3
14
4 + 11
14
0 = 6
7
, which is less than the current price.
Therefore, the bubble in period 1 in state !7 is a common expected bubble. Actually,
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the reader can check that in our example the common expected bubble exists in period 1,
not only in state !7, but also in any other state.
1.3.2.3 Check of Equilibrium Conditions
Last, check that the prices and trades described above constitute a rational expectations
equilibrium. We check all four conditions step by step.
Check (C1): We observe from the trade table that the minimum amount of trade in
period 2 is  1. By the fact that there is no trade in either period 1 or 3 and that each agent
is endowed with 1 share of the risky asset, the no short sales condition is satisfied for xA
and xB. To see if the xi’s are information feasible, it suffices to only look at period 2 since
no trade occurs either in period 1 or 3. In period 2, actually each agent’s action remains
the same given the same price–and-trade-refined information.19 This implies that xA and
xB also satisfy the information feasibility condition.
Check (C2): Maximization of the expected payoff at the beginning of period 1 under
the constraints of information feasibility and no short sales, is equivalent to maximization
of the expected payoff in each period given the current price–and-trade-refined information
under the same constraints.
In period 3, each agent has no incentive to trade since the price is exactly equal to the
dividend for every state.
19 Take agent A for example.
8! = !6; sPXA2 (!) = f!6g  f!4; !5; !6g = f!0 : xA2 (!0) = xA2 (!)g,
8! 2 f!4; !5g ; sPXA2 (!) = f!4; !5g  f!4; !5; !6g = f!0 : xA2 (!0) = xA2 (!)g,
8! 2 f!1; !2; !3g ; sPXA2 (!) = f!1; !2; !3g = f!0 : xA2 (!0) = xA2 (!)g,
8! 2 f!7; !8g ; sPXA2 (!) = f!g  f!7; !8g = f!0 : xA2 (!0) = xA2 (!)g.
19
In period 2, there are in total 4 cases:
(p2-i)8i 2 fA;Bg, if agent i observes the event f!7g or f!8g, he knows that with
probability 1 the price in period 3 will be 0, which is equal to the current price, thus
he is indifferent between trading or not in period 2, so the equilibrium trade of 0
maximizes his expected payoff in this case.
(p2-ii)If agent A observes the event f!1; !2; !3g (or if agent B observes the event
f!4; !5; !6g), he will deduce that the expected price in period 3 will be
1
2
4 + 1
4
0 + 1
4
0 = 2, which is equal to the current price, thus he is indifferent between
trading or not in period 2, so the equilibrium trade of 1 maximizes his expected payoff
in this case.
(p2-iii)If agent A observes the event f!4; !5g (or if agent B observes the event f!1; !2g), he
will deduce that the expected price in period 3 will be 1
3
4 + 2
3
0 = 4
3
, which is less the
current price 2, thus he has an incentive to sell any of the asset he owns in period 2, so
under the short sales constraint and given there is no trade in period 1, the equilibrium
trade of  1 maximizes his expected payoff in this case.
(p2-iv)If agent A observes the event f!6g (or if agent B observes the event f!3g), he knows
that with probability 1 the price in period 3 will be 0, which is less the current price 2,
thus he has an incentive to sell any of the asset he owns in period 2, so under the short
sales constraint and given there is no trade in period 1, the equilibrium trade of  1
maximizes his expected payoff in this case.
In period 1, there are 2 cases:
(p1-i)If agent A observes the event f!6; !7g (or if agent B observes the event f!3; !7g), he
will deduce that the expected price in period 2 will be 1
2
2 + 1
2
0 = 1, which is equal
to the current price, thus he is indifferent between trading or not in period 1, so the
equilibrium trade of 0 maximizes his expected payoff in this case.
(p1-ii)If agent i observes the event other than the one described in (p1-i), he will deduce
that the expected price in period 2 will be 22+13
14
2 + 7
14
0 = 1, which is equal to
the current price, thus he is indifferent between trading or not in period 1, so the
equilibrium trade of 0 maximizes his expected payoff in this case.
The above analysis guarantees that condition (C2) is satisfied.
Check (C3) and (C4): It is seen that the market clears in each period in each state from
the table of trades, hence (C3) is satisfied. Note that P1 (!) = 1 8! 2 
, hence P1 () is
measurable with respect to j1 (). Also note that j3 (!) = f!g 8! 2 
, hence P3 () is
measurable with respect to j3 (!). To see P2 () is measurable with respect to j2 (!), note
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that 8n = 1;    ; 6, j2 (!n)  f!1; !2; !3; !4; !5; !6g = f! : P2 (!) = P2 (!n) = 2g,
and 8n = 7; 8, j2 (!n)  f!7; !8g = f! : P2 (!) = P2 (!n) = 0g. This completes the
check that the prices and trades given in the example constitute a rational expectations
equilibrium.
1.3.3 Discussion
We have shown that, in a simple finite horizon model with asymmetric information
and short sales constraints, a strong bubble and a common expected bubble can exist in
the same period in the same state in a rational expectations equilibrium with common
knowledge of trades, under the same basic setting as in AMP (1993).
It is worthwhile to make some remarks about this simple example.
(1)The initial distribution of the asset is not efficient. To see this, with zero-trade, each
agent’s expected payoff
mi +
X
!2

i (!)
"
eiPT (!) +
TX
t=1
xit (!) [Pt+1 (!)  Pt (!)]
#
would have been mi + 34 , while in the equilibrium, each agent’s expected payoff is
mi + 1. Thus our example does not violate the no-trade theorem and the necessary
condition of ex ante inefficiency is satisfied here. In fact, as the analysis has shown,
in our example those who gain from the trade are the sellers whenever the trade takes
place.
(2)The social welfare is maximized in the rational expectation equilibrium with bubbles
if there is no initial endowment of money. Note that in our example the social welfare
is maximized when in every state the social planner gives all the assets to the agent
who puts the highest weight on that state. Hence the maximum social welfare should
be 9
8
(m1 +m2) + 2. When either agent has positive endowment of money, the social
welfare of the equilibrium outcome is not maximized. However, if each agent is
endowed with no money, then the social welfare is maximized in equilibrium. To put
it in another way, if the social planner is only allowed to reallocate on the risky asset,
then the equilibrium maximizes the sum of the utilities of the agents. This implies a
surprising observation that the rational bubbles do not necessarily lead to inefficiency.
(3)The short sale constraints are binding in period 2 for the sellers whenever the trade
takes place. In the cases of (p2-iii) and (p2-iv), where agents play the seller’s role,
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since the expected price for the asset is higher than the current price, agents would
like to take advantage of this and sell as much as they can. If there were no short sales
constraints, an equilibrium would not have been reached under the current price. This
is where the no short sales assumption plays its role.
(4)The asymmetric information functions in such a way that even though all agents
know that the asset is overpriced, they are still willing to hold the asset as long as the
information on overpricing is not common knowledge in the strong sense. It is this
feature that makes a bubble possible in a rational expectations equilibrium.
(5)For simplicity, the example is constructed in such a way that even though trade is
common knowledge, it reveals no additional information to either agent.
1.4 Structural Characteristics for the Existence of Bubbles
Assume there are only two agents. There is no trade in the first period and
information becomes perfect in the last period. The dividend can only take two values,
8!; d (!) 2 f0; Dg where D > 0.
Claim 2 Under the perfect memory assumption, suppose there is a bubble in period t in
state ! in a rational expectations equilibrium in economy with state set 
. Then there is
also a bubble in equilibrium in the subeconomy with state set mPXt (!).
Claim 3 Under the perfect memory assumption, for a strong bubble to exist in a rational
expectations equilibrium in a 2-agent 3-period economy, there must be at least 2 states with
positive dividends, that is
jf! 2 
jd (!) > 0gj  2.
Proof. Suppose a strong bubble exists in period 1 in state !.
Consider agent A first. Since P1 (!) > max!2sPXA1 (!) d (!) = 0 and P1 (!
) =
EA

P2 (!
0) j!0 2 sPXA1 (!)

, the fact that agent A is willing to hold the asset implies that
9!A 2 sPXA1 (!) such that P2
 
!A
  P1 (!) > 0. Since sPXA2  !A  sPXA1  !A =
sPXA1 (!
), when !A is realized, in period 2 agent A knows for sure that he will receive
nothing. Give P2
 
!A

> 0, it must be the case that when !A is realized, in period 2
agent B’s expected return is nonzero. This implies that 9!AB 2 sPXB2
 
!A

such that
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d
 
!AB

> 0. Since in equilibrium in period 2 agent A will always sell in state !A
and agent B cannot tell the difference between !A and !AB, it must be the case that in
equilibrium in period 2 agent A will always sell in state !AB as well.
Then consider agent B, and we have similar results. 9!B 2 sPXB1 (!) such that
P2
 
!B

> 0 and when !B is realized, in period 2 agent B knows for sure that he will
receive nothing. This implies that 9!BA 2 sPXA2
 
!B

such that d
 
!BA

> 0 and in
equilibrium in period 2 agent B will always sell in state !BA.
Since in equilibrium in period 2 agent A always sells in state !AB and agent B always
sells in state !BA, !AB 6= !BA.
Definition 8 (Symmetry) The model has a symmetric setting if for any i; j = 1; 2;    ; I ,
there exists a bijective mapping L from f1; 2;    ; N = j
jg to f1; 2;    ; Ng such that for
any t = 1; 2; 3,
(1) Sit = SjtjL, where SjtjL is j’s relabelled information partition at t under L;
(2) i (!n) = j
 
!L(n)

;
(3) d (!n) = d
 
!L(n)

;
(4) (mi; ei) = (mj; ej) .
Basically equation (1) means that it is information-symmetric. Similarly it is
belief-symmetric by (2), dividend-symmetric by (3), and endowment-symmetric by (4).
It should be noted that the symmetry assumption is more than assuming symmetry
w.r.t information, symmetry w.r.t. dividend, symmetry w.r.t. belief, and symmetry w.r.t.
endowment, respectively. That is because we require the same mapping L for conditions
(1)-(3) to be satisfied.
We call
 
!n; !L(n)

a symmetric pair of states for agent i and j if L (L (n)) = n.
Recall that a state where there is a strong bubble is called a bubble state, denoted by !.
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Claim 4 For a strong bubble to exist in a symmetric rational expectations equilibrium in
a 2-agent symmetric economy, there must be at least 2 states with positive dividends, that
is
jf! 2 
jd (!) > 0gj  2.
Proof. By AMP(1993), for a strong bubble to exist in a rational expectations equilibrium,
there must be potential gains from trade. And these gains will be distributed to the agents
in each trade. But since there is no constraint on the short sales of money, in each trade the
agent who is buying the asset won’t receive any gains, otherwise he would be buying as
much as he can, in which situation there would be no equilibrium. Therefore, the agents
receive the gains only if they play the role of sellers. Since it is a symmetric economy,
each agent has a positive probability to sell the asset. Consider Agent A first. Suppose he
is better off by selling the asset in period t in state !A. Then in period t there must be a
state with positive dividend, denoted by !BA , from which agent B cannot tell the difference
to !A. Since agent B is buying in period t in state !BA , this implies that agent A is selling
in period t in !BA . By symmetry, in period t, there exists another state !AB with positive
dividend, where agent A is buying and agent B is selling. Obviously !BA 6= !AB.
Claim 5 Under the perfect memory assumption, for a strong bubble to exist in a ratio-
nal expectations equilibrium in a 2-agent symmetric economy, for each agent, at least one
price-and-trade-refined information set contains at least 3 states, including one with posi-
tive dividend, that is
8i;9t;9! such that sPXit (!)  3 and max!02sPXit (!) d (!0) > 0.
Proof. Let ! be the bubble state. Suppose in period 1 agent A cannot tell difference
between ! and !A, both of which are zero-dividend states. And without loss of generality,
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suppose in period t in state !A agent A can sell the asset at a positive price. This implies
that in period t agent B cannot tell difference between !A and some positive-dividend
state !BA , or !A 2 sPXBt
 
!BA

. Since agent B will be buying in period t in state !BA , agent
A must be selling, hence in period t there must exist some zero-dividend state !0 such
that !0 2 sPXAt
 
!BA

. If !0 2 sPXBt
 
!BA

, we are done. Suppose not, then there must exisit
some positive-dividend state !00 such that !00 2 sPXBt (!0). And this would again imply
that there exists some zero-dividend state !000 such that !000 2 sPXAt (!00). If !00 2 sPXAt (!0)
or !000 2 sPXBt (!0), we are done. If not, we can follow the same logic. Since the number
of states is finite, and sPXAt (!A) does not contain any positive-dividend states, at the end
we will find a price-and-trade-refined information set which contains at least 3 states
including one with positive dividend. By symmetry this is also true for agent B.
Claim 6 Under the perfect memory assumption, for a strong bubble to exist in a rational
expectations equilibrium in a 2-agent symmetric economy, there must be at least 8 states,
that is
j
j  8.
Proof. Suppose not and there are only 7 states instead. Assume in period t agent i has
a price-and-trade-refined information set f!i1; !i2; !i3g and the bubble state is !. This
implies Pt (!) = 0 and Pt (!ik) > 0 for i = A;B and k = 1; 2; 3. It is easy to know
that in period 1 for agent A, sPXA1 (!)  f!; !B1; !B2; !B3g. Without loss of generality,
assume !B1 2 sPXA1 (!). Since there is no trade in period 1, the equilibrium price should
be equal to agent A’s expected price. This implies P1 (!B1) < Pt (!ik) from agent A’s
perspective.
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Now consider agent B. It is easy to know that in period 1 for agent B,
f!B1; !B2; !B3g  sPXB1 (!B1)  f!A1; !A2; !A3; !B1; !B2; !B3g. But this would
imply P1 (!B1) = Pt (!ik) from agent B’s perspective.
Therefore, there must be at least 8 states.
Claim 7 For a common expected bubble to exist in period t in state !, it must be the case
that the current price is higher than every agent’s expected dividend across the meet of the
information partition containing !, that is
8i = 1; 2;    ; I; Pt (!) > Ei

d (!0) j!0 2 mPXt (!)

.
Proof. By the definition of common expected bubbles, 8i = 1; 2;    ; I;8!0 2
mPXt (!) ; Pt (!) > Ei

d (!00) j!00 2 sPXit (!0)

.
Since Ei

d (!0) j!0 2 mPXt (!)

is weighted average of Ei

d (!00) j!00 2 sPXit (!0)

,
immediately we have Pt (!) > Ei

d (!0) j!0 2 mPXt (!)

.
It turns out that the example of strong bubbles and common expected bubbles we have
presented in the previous section is actually the simplest one with minimum number of
states.
1.5 General Results
In Section 3, an example of a rational bubble that is both a strong bubble and a
common expected bubble is presented in a rational expectations equilibrium with 2 agents.
Furthermore, as will be shown next, this result holds for any finite number of agents.
Let SF  ff!g j! 2 
g, and SF is called the perfect information structure for 
.
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Before constructing bubble examples, we shall make some restrictions on the agents’
information structure so as to avoid trial bubbles from duplications.
Assumption 1 (Different Information Structure) 8i; j = 1;    ; I ,8t = 1;    ; T , Sit; Sjt 6=
SF ) Sit 6= Sjt.
The assumption of Different Information Structure says that as long as agents don’t
have perfect information, there must be somewhere their information differs from each
other. This assumption rules out the possibility of duplicating identical agents.
Assumption 2 (Distinct Information Everywhere) 8i; j = 1;    ; I ,8t = 1;    ; T , 8! 2

, sit (!) ; sjt (!) 6= f!g ) sit (!) 6= sjt (!).
The assumption of Distinct Information Everywhere says that as long as agents don’t
have perfect information, their information differs from each other everywhere. It is easy
to know that Assumption 2 is much stronger than Assumption 1. Assumption 2 implies
Assumption 1, but not vice versa.
Assumption 3 (Common Knowledge of Trades) 8i = 1;    ; I ,8t = 1;    ; T , xit is
common knowledge.
Based on the assumptions above, two propositions can be made on the existence of
strong bubbles in a rational expectations equilibrium.
Proposition 8 Under Assumption 1 and 3, for any I  2, there exists an economy under
the framework described in Section 2, with I agents, 3 periods and 3I+2 states, presenting
a bubble, both strong and common expected, in a rational expectations equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix 1.
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Proposition 9 Under Assumption 2 and 3, for any I  2, there exists an economy under
the framework described in Section 2, with I agents, 3 periods and I  max f3; Ig + 2
states, presenting a bubble, both strong and common expected, in a rational expectations
equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix 2.
The strong bubble part of the result is not new, and has been analyzed by AMP (1993)
and Conlon (2004). However, by presenting a bubble, not only strong but also common
expected, the above propositions provide a new answer to what properties of bubbles we
can expect to have in a rational world. The common expected bubble part of the result is
surprising since it is somewhat counterintuitive that an expected bubble can be robust to
common knowledge in a raitional expectations equilibrium. But actually it is the common
knowledge of the heterogeneous beliefs and the information structures that guarantees that
agents have no incentive to rush in face of bubbles, because by rational expectations they
know that they can take advantage of it in a later period.
It should also be noted that the conclusions above are independent of the assumption
of no common knowledge of trade. In Proposition 3 of AMP (1993), the assumption of
no common knowledge of trades was argued as a necessary condition for the existence of
bubbles in a rational expectations equilibrium. The idea of the argument is the following:
Geanakoplos (1992) has argued that with common knowledge of trades, agents would have
behaved in the same way without the private part of their information (originally stated
as "common knowledge of actions negates asymmetric information about events"), and
then there would be no strong bubbles since there is no asymmetric information about the
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states. However, as pointed out by Conlon (2004), the conclusion that there are no strong
bubbles is only true for the new economy where every agent has the same information,
which is the common part of their original information. The bubble may still exist in
the original economy since in period 1 there is no trade and hence agents still have their
private information.
1.6 The Coexistence of Second Order Strong Bubbles and Common Expected
Bubbles
1.6.1 Exogenous Setting
In this section an even strong result is provide regarding the higher order uncertain.
Here I provide an example for the coexistence of second order strong bubbles and common
expected bubbles in a rational expectations equilibrium. The examples for higher order
strong bubbles can be constructed similarly. It is checked that the nth order strong bubble
model in Conlon (2008) does not have the "common expected" feature.
There are 2 agents (A and B), 4 periods (1, 2, 3, and 4) and 14 states (!1, !2, !3, !4,
!5, !6, !7, !8, !9, !10, !11, !12, !13 and !14). Only 2 assets exist in the market: one
is money and the other is called a risky asset. Each share of the risky asset will pay a
dividend of amount 8 at the end of period 4 if the state is either !1 or !4, and will pay
nothing otherwise, as shown in the table below.
Table 1:5 Dividend Distribution Accross States
State !1 !2 !3 !4 !5 !6 !7 !8 !9 !10 !11 !12 !13 !14
d (!) 8 0 0 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Each agent is endowed with mi unit of money and 1 share of the risk asset at the
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beginning of period 1. Agents can trade in each of period 1, 2, 3 and 4. At period 4, after
the trade is made, the dividend is realized, and then the consumption takes place.
Since the asymmetric information is the key to generate bubbles, we achieve this
goal by giving agents different information structures. Recall that agent i’s (i = A;B)
information about the state in period t (t = 1; 2; 3; 4) is represented by Sit, a partition of
the space 
. The specific structures of Sit’s are given below.
SA1 = ff!1; !2; !4; !5; !8; !10; !13; !14g ; f!6; !7; !12g ; f!3; !9; !11gg
SB1 = ff!1; !2; !4; !5; !8; !9; !13; !14g ; f!3; !7; !11g ; f!6; !10; !12gg
SA2 = ff!1; !2; !13g ; f!4; !5; !10; !14g ; f!3; !9gg [ ff!ng jn = 6; 7; 8; 11; 12g
SB2 = ff!4; !5; !14g ; f!1; !2; !9; !13g ; f!6; !10gg [ ff!ng jn = 3; 7; 8; 11; 12g
SA3 = ff!1; !2g ; f!4; !5; !10gg [ ff!ng jn = 3; 6; 7; 8; 9; 11; 12; 13; 14g
SB3 = ff!4; !5g ; f!1; !2; !9gg [ ff!ng jn = 3; 6; 7; 8; 10; 11; 12; 13; 14g
SA4 = SB4 = ff!ng jn = 1;    ; 14g
There are different approaches to generate potential gains from trade. Instead of
assuming different marginal utility levels accross the states, here we let agents have
heterogeneous beliefs, as shown in the table below with weight W = 1
38
.
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Table 1:6 Agents’ Beliefs Accross States
State !1 !2 !3 !4 !5 !6 !7 !8 !9 !10 !11 !12 !13 !14
A 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 15 1 1 2 1 3 5
B 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 15 1 1 1 2 5 3
1.6.2 A Rational Expectations Equilibrium with a Bubble
Recall the standard definition of rational expectations equilibrium, and in our example
a rational expectations equilibrium will be a vector (P; x) 2 R414+ R2414 such that
(C1) 8i = A;B, xi are information feasible and satisfy no short sales.
(C2) 8i = A;B, xi maximizes player i’s expected payoff with respect to his own
price-and-trade-refined information.
(C3) 8t = 1; 2; 3; 4;8n = 1;    ; 14; xAt (!n) + xBt (!n) = 0.
(C4) 8t = 1; 2; 3; 4;8n;m = 1;    ; 14; jt (!n)  f!m : Pt (!m) = Pt (!n)g.
Although there are multiple rational expectations equilibria for this example, the one
with the equilibrium prices and trades given in the following two tables is what we are
interested in - the one in which there is a second order strong bubble and a common
expected bubble.
Table 1:7 Equilibrium Prices
State !1 !2 !3 !4 !5 !6 !7 !8 !9 !10 !11 !12 !13 !14
P1 (!) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
P2 (!) 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 2 2
P3 (!) 4 4 0 4 4 0 0 0 4 4 0 0 0 0
P4 (!) 8 0 0 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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Table 1:8 Equilibrium Net Trades
8! 2 
; xA1 (!) = xB1 (!) = xA4 (!) = xB4 (!) = 0
State !1 !2 !3 !4 !5 !6 !7 !8 !9 !10 !11 !12 !13 !14
xA2 (!) 1 1 1  1  1  1 0 0 1  1 0 0 1  1
xB2 (!)  1  1  1 1 1 1 0 0  1 1 0 0  1 1
xA2 (!) + xB2 (!) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
xA3 (!)  2  2 0 2 2 0 0 0  2 2 0 0 0 0
xB3 (!) 2 2 0  2  2 0 0 0 2  2 0 0 0 0
xA3 (!) + xB3 (!) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1.6.2.1 Price-and-Trade-Refined Information
First derive the price–and-trade-refined information for each agent in each period. It
can be checked that our example is constructed in a way that the price and trade does not
reveal any additional information to the agents. So we have SPXit = SPXit for i = A;B,
t = 1; 2; 3; 4.
The following graph may give more intuition about the information structure than the
mathematical expression does. In the graph, agent A’s information sets are described by
the black solid curves, agent B’s information sets are described by the blue dotted curves,
and dividend paying states are emphasized in gray color.
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Figure 1:2: 4-Period Information Structure for Agent A and Agent B
1.6.2.2 The Existence of 2nd Order Strong Bubbles and Common Expected
Bubbles
Second note that there is a second order strong bubble at period 1 in state !7.
For agent A, sPXA1 (!7) = f!6; !7; !12g, P1 (!7) = 1 > 0 = d (!6) = d (!7) ==
d (!12). This means that at period 1 when the state !7 is realized agent A knows
sure that the price of the asset is higher than any possible dividend he will receive.
Furthermore, sPXB1 (!7) = f!3; !7; !11g, sPXB1 (!6) = sPXB1 (!12) = f!6; !10; !12g, and
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d (!3) = d (!6) = d (!7) = d (!10) = d (!11) = d (!12) = 0. This is equivalent to saying
that 8! 2 sPXA1 (!7), 8!0 2 sPXB1 (!),d (!0) = 0 < 1 = P1 (!), which implies that at period
1 in state !7 agent A knows that agent B knows that that the price of the asset is higher
than any possible dividend he (agent B) will receive. By symmetry, it surffices to check
for agent A only.
In this example, mPX1 (!7) = 
. To see that this bubble is robust to common
knowledge in the expected sense, by symmetry it suffices to check that 8! 2 
; 1 >
1P
!02sPX
A1
(!)
A(!0)
P
!02sPXA1 (!) A (!
0) d (!0). There are three cases:
(1)! 2 f!1; !2; !4; !5; !8; !10; !13; !14g: Agent A will induce that the expected
dividend in period 3 will be 3
30
8 + 27
30
0 = 4
5
, which is less to the current price 1.
(2)! 2 f!6; !7; !12g: In this case agent A’s expected dividend in period 3 is 0, less than
the current price.
(3)! 2 f!3; !9; !11g: again in this case agent A’s expected dividend in period 3 is 0, less
than the current price.
Therefore, the bubble at period 1 in state !7 is a common expected bubble. Actually,
the reader can check that in our example the common expected bubble exists at period 1,
not only in state !7, but also in any other state.
1.6.2.3 Check of Equilibrium Conditions
Last check that the prices and trades described above constitute a rational expectations
equilibrium. We check all the four conditions step by step.
Check (C1): We observe from the trade table that (1) the minimum amount of net trade
at period 2 is  1; (2) in any state where an agent’s net trade at period 3 is  2 his net trade
at period 2 is 1; (3) there is no trade in period 1; and (4) there is no trade in period 4. it is
also given that (5) each agent is endowed with 1 share of the risky asset. (4) implies that as
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long as the short sale constraint is satisfied for period 3, it is satisfied for period 4. (2), (3)
and (5) together impliy that as long as the short sale constraint is satisfied for period 2, it
is satisfied for period 3. From (1) and (3) we know the no short sale condition is satisfied
for period 1 and 2. To see if xi are information feasible, it suffices to only look at period 2
and 3 since no trade occurs either in period 1 or 4. In period 2, actually each agent’s action
remains the same given the same price–and-trade-refined information.20 This is also true
for period 3. This implies that xA and xB also satisfy the information feasibility condition.
Check (C2): Maximization of the expected payoff at the beginning of period 1 under
the constraints of information feasibility and no short sales, is equivalent to maximization
of the expected payoff in each period given the current price–and-trade-refined information
under the same constraints. By symmetry, it suffices to consider agent A’s case. In period
4, agent A has no incentive to trade since the price is exactly equal to the dividend for
every state.
In period 3, there are in total 4 cases:
(p3-i)If agent A observes the event f!ng where n 2 f3; 6; 7; 8; 11; 12; 13; 14g, he knows
that with probability 1 the price in period 4 will be 0, which is equal to the current
price, thus he is indifferent between trading or not at period 3, so the equilibrium trade
of 0 maximizes his expected payoff in this case.
(p3-ii)If agent A observes the event f!1; !2g, he will induce that the expected price in period
4 will be 1
3
8 + 2
3
0 = 8
3
, which is less than the current price 4, thus he has incentive
to sell any of the asset he owns at period 3, so under the short sale constraint, the
20 Take agent A for example.
8! = !6; sPXA2 (!) = f!6g  f!4; !5; !6; !10; !14g = f!0 : xA2 (!0) = xA2 (!)g,
8! 2 f!4; !5; !10; !14g ;
sPXA2 (!) = f!4; !5; !10; !14g  f!4; !5; !6; !10; !14g = f!0 : xA2 (!0) = xA2 (!)g,
8! 2 f!3; !9g ; sPXA2 (!) = f!3; !9g  f!1; !2; !3; !9; !13g = f!0 : xA2 (!0) = xA2 (!)g,
8! 2 f!1; !2; !13g ; sPXA2 (!) = f!1; !2; !13g  f!1; !2; !3; !9; !13g = f!0 : xA2 (!0) = xA2 (!)g,
8! 2 f!7; !8; !11; !12g ; sPXA2 (!) = f!g  f!7; !8; !11; !12g = f!0 : xA2 (!0) = xA2 (!)g.
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equilibrium trade of  2 maximizes his expected payoff in this case.
(p3-iii)If agent A observes the event f!4; !5; !10g, he will induce that the expected price
in period 4 will be 2
4
8 + 1
4
0 + 1
4
0 = 4, which is equal to the current price, thus he is
indifferent between trading or not at period 3, so the equilibrium trade of 2 maximizes
his expected payoff in this case.
(p3-iv)If agent A observes the event f!9g, he knows that with probability 1 the price in
period 4 will be 0, which is less the current price P3 (!9) = 4, thus he has incentive
to sell any of the asset he owns at period 3, so under the short sale constraint the
equilibrium trade of  2 maximizes his expected payoff in this case.
In period 2, there are in total 5 cases:
(p2-i)if agent A observes the event f!ng where n 2 f7; 8; 11; 12g, he knows that with
probability 1 the price in period 3 will be 0, which is equal to the current price, thus
he is indifferent between trading or not at period 2, so the equilibrium trade of 0
maximizes his expected payoff in this case.
(p2-ii)If agent A observes the event f!1; !2; !13g, he will induce that the expected price
in period 3 will be 1
6
4 + 2
6
4 + 3
6
0 = 2, which is equal to the current price, thus he is
indifferent between trading or not at period 2, so the equilibrium trade of 1 maximizes
his expected payoff in this case.
(p2-iii)If agent A observes the event f!3; !9g, he will induce that the expected price in period
3 will be 1
2
4 + 1
2
0 = 2, which is equal to the current price, thus he is indifferent
between trading or not at period 2, so the equilibrium trade of 1 maximizes his
expected payoff in this case.
(p2-iv)If agent A observes the event f!4; !5; !10; !14g, he will induce that the expected price
in period 3 will be 2
9
4 + 1
9
4 + 1
9
4 + 5
9
0 = 16
9
, which is less the current price 2, thus
he has incentive to sell any of the asset he owns at period 2, so under the short sale
constraint, the equilibrium trade of  1 maximizes his expected payoff in this case.
(p2-v)If agent A observes the event f!6g, he knows that with probability 1 the price in
period 3 will be 0, which is less the current price 2, thus he has incentive to sell any of
the asset he owns at period 2, so under the short sale constraint, the equilibrium trade
of  1 maximizes his expected payoff in this case.
In period 1, there are 3 cases:
(p1-i)If agent A observes the event f!6; !7; !12g, he will induce that the expected price
in period 2 will be 2
4
2 + 1
4
0 + 1
4
0 = 1, which is equal to the current price, thus he is
indifferent between trading or not at period 1, so the equilibrium trade of 0 maximizes
his expected payoff in this case.
(p1-ii)If agent i observes the event f!3; !9; !11g, he will induce that the expected price in
period 2 will be 1
4
2 + 1
4
2 + 2
4
0 = 1, which is equal to the current price, thus he is
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indifferent between trading or not at period 1, so the equilibrium trade of 0 maximizes
his expected payoff in this case.
(p1-iii)If agent i observes the event f!ng where n 2 f1; 2; 4; 5; 8; 10; 13; 14g, he will induce
that the expected price in period 2 will be 13+22+3+5
30
2 + 15
30
0 = 1, which is equal
to the current price, thus he is indifferent between trading or not at period 1, so the
equilibrium trade of 0 maximizes his expected payoff in this case.
The above analysis guarantees that the condition (C2) is satisfied.
Check (C3) and (C4): It is seen that the market clears in each period at each
state from the table of trades, hence (C3) is satisfied. Note that P1 (!) = 1
8! 2 
 hence P1 () is measurable with respect to j1 () and that j3 (!) = f!g
8! 2 
 hence P3 () is measurable with respect to j3 (!). To see P2 ()
is measurable with respect to j2 (!), note that 8n = 1;    ; 6; 9; 10; 13; 14,
j2 (!n)  ff!ng jn = 1;    ; 6; 9; 10; 13; 14g = f! : P2 (!) = P2 (!n) = 2g and
8n = 7; 8; 11; 12, j2 (!n)  ff!ng jn = 7; 8; 11; 12g = f! : P2 (!) = P2 (!n) = 0g.
To see P3 () is measurable with respect to j3 (!), note that 8n = 1; 2; 5; 6; 9; 10,
j2 (!n)  ff!ng jn = 1; 2; 5; 6; 9; 10g = f! : P3 (!) = P3 (!n) = 4g and
8n = 3; 4; 7; 8; 11;    ; 14, j2 (!n)  ff!ng jn = 3; 4; 7; 8; 11;    ; 14g =
f! : P3 (!) = P3 (!n) = 0g. This completes the check that the prices and trades
given in the example constitute a rational expectations equilibrium.
1.7 Conclusion
Based on the work of Allen, Morris and Postlewaite (1993), Conlon (2004), and many
others, this paper develops two new concepts of rational bubbles: a common expected
bubble and a common strong bubble, and shows that in a finite-state finite-horizon model
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the following results hold for any finite number of agents. First, there is no common strong
bubble in any rational expectations equilibrium under the perfect memory assumption.
Second, there exists a three-period economy with asymmetric information and short sales
constraints, where an expected bubble can exist in a rational expectations equilibrium, and
moreover this bubble, is not only a strong bubble, but also a common expected bubble.
The first result partially answers what properties a bubble cannot have in a rational world,
and the second result tells more about what a bubble might look like, given the results in
AMP (1993) and Conlon (2004). The necessary structural conditions in Section 4 provide
insight into the structural characteristics of models of bubbles. One important condition is
that for a strong bubble to exist in equilibrium the minimum number of states is 8.
One direction for future work will be to show the coexistence of common expected
bubbles and higher order strong bubbles for any finite number of agents, following Conlon
(2004) in which an example of higher order bubbles is constructed for the two-agent case.
Another direction will be to introduce some irrational agents into the model and to see
whether a common strong bubble can exist in such a setting. Since bubbles modeled in this
paper are not robust to perturbations in a general sense, introducing noise into the model
might be another good direction. It might also be important and potentially interesting to
test the theory on the existence of rational bubbles by conducting experimental work.
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Appendix
Appendix 1:
Proof to Proposition 2:
Write
 = f!njn = 1; 2;    ; 3I + 2g. Let
D  f!n 2 
jn = 3i  2; i = 1; 2;    ; Ig,

2W  f!n 2 
jn = 3i  1; i = 1; 2;    ; Ig, 
i  f!3i 2; !3i 1; !3ig, 
 i 

in f!3ig = f!3i 2; !3i 1g, i = 1; 2;    I .
Each share of the risky asset will pay a dividend of amount 4 at the end of period 3 if
the state ! 2 
D and will pay nothing otherwise. Each agent is endowed with I units of
money and 1 share of the risky asset at the beginning of period 1.
The specific structures of Sit’s are given by
S11 = f
n f!3I ; !3I+1g ; f!3I ; !3I+1gg
Si1 = f
n f!3i 3; !3I+1g ; f!3i 3; !3I+1gg 8i = 2;    ; I
S12 =


1;
2;    ;
I 1;
 I ; f!3Ig ; f!3I+1g ; f!3I+2g
	
Si2 =


1;    ;
i 2;
i;    ;
I ;
 i 1; f!3i 3g ; f!3I+1g ; f!3I+2g
	 8i = 2;    ; I
Si3 = S
F 8i = 1; 2;    ; I .
The agents’ beliefs about the states are given by the following functions.
i (!n) =
8<: 2W if n = 3i  2 or !n 2 
2Wn f!3i 1g(4I   1)W if n = 3I + 2
W otherwise
8i = 1; 2;    ; I;W = 1
8I
.
To see that the belief of agent i is well defined, note that the number of elements in
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2W is I , hence there are I states which are put with probability 2W . Since there is only
one state with probability (3I + 2)W , the number of the states with probability W is
3I+2  I  1 = 2I+1. Thus,
X
!2

i (!) = I 2W +1 (4I   1)W +(2I + 1)W =
8IW = 1.
The equilibrium with the prices and trades given below is what we look for - the one in
which there is a strong and common expected bubble in period 1 in state !
3I+1
.
P1 (!) = 18! 2 
.
P2 (!n) =

0 if n = 3I + 1 or n = 3I + 2
2 otherwise .
P3 (!n) =

4 if n 2 
D
0 otherwise .
8i = 1; 2;    ; I;8! 2 
; xi1 (!) = xi3 (!) = 0.
xi2 (!n) =
8<: I   1 if !n 2 
i0 if n = 3I + 1 or n = 3I + 2 1 otherwise 8i = 1; 2;    ; I .
Observe that neither the prices nor the trades reveal any addition information with the
settings above.
It can be similarly checked following the procedures described in the two-agent
example that the above prices and trades constitute a rational expectations equilibrium.
And since in period 1 in state !
3I+1
, each agent knows that he will receive nothing at the
end of period 3, given the positive price of 1 in period 1, there exists a strong bubble in this
equilibrium.
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Note that mPX1
 
!
3I+1

= 
. To see that this bubble is robust to common
knowledge in the expected sense, we need to check that 8i = 1; 2;    ; I; 8! 2 
; 1 >
1X
!02sPX
i1
(!)
i(!0)
X
!02sPXi1 (!)
i (!
0) d (!0). Note that for agent 1 (or agent i, i  2), either he
will observe f!3I ; !3I+1g (or f!3i 3; !3I+1g), or he will observe 
n f!3I ; !3I+1g (or

n f!3i 3; !3I+1g). If it is the first case, his expected dividend will be 120 + 120 = 0; If it is
the second case, his expected dividend will be I+1
8I 24 +
7I 3
8I 20 =
2I+2
4I 1 . In either case, the
expected dividend is less than the price. Therefore, the bubble in period 1 in state !3I+1 is
a common expected bubble.
However it should noted under the structure above, 8!n 2 
n f!3I+1; !3I+2g, in
period 2 in state !n there are always (I   1) agents who observes the same event

i = f!3i 2; !3i 1; !3ig 21 where i is determined such that !n 2 
i. Obviously this
violates Assumption 2. In order to ensure that agents’ information differs from each other
everywhere when there is no perfect information, the number of the states has to be large
enough to guarantee the existence of bubbles.
Appendix 2:
Proof to Proposition 3:
The case of 2 agents has already been shown in section 3. Here it suffices to consider
the case when I  3.
Write
 = f!njn = 1; 2;    ; I2 + 2g. Let
D  f!n 2 
jn = I (i  1) + 1; i = 1; 2;    ; Ig,
21 Though there is one agent observing f!ng or 
in f!ng, 
i is common knowledge in this case. And this
feature holds also for the constructed example under proposition.
41

(I 1)W  f!n 2 
jn = I (i  1) + 2; i = 1; 2;    ; Ig,
j  f!n 2 
jI (j   1) + 1  n  Ijg,

 kj  
jn

!I(j 1)+k
	
, j; k = 1; 2;    I .
Again, each share of the risky asset will pay a dividend of amount 4 at the end of period
3 if the state ! 2 
D and will pay nothing otherwise. Each agent is endowed with I units
of money and 1 share of the risky asset at the beginning of period 1.
Let aij be the ith row and jth column element of the following I  I matrix. Hence
!I(j 1)+aij is the aijth element in 
j .
26666664
2 3    I   1 I
I 2    I   2 I   1
I   1 I 2    I   2
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
3 4    I 2
2 3    I   1 I
37777775
The specific structures of Sit’s are given by
Si1 = f
n f!Iki ; !I2+1g ; f!Iki ; !I2+1gg where ki is determined by aiki = I
Si2 =

!I(j 1)+aij
	
: 1  j  I; j 6= i	 [ n
 aijj : 1  j  I; j 6= io [ f
i; f!I2+1g ; f!I2+2gg
Si3 = S
F 8i = 1; 2;    ; I .
The agents’ beliefs about the states are given by the following functions. 8i =
1; 2;    ; I;
i (!n) =
8<: (I   1)W if n = I (i  1) + 1 or !n 2 
(I 1)Wn

!I(i 1)+2
	
(2I (I   1)  1)W if n = I2 + 2
W otherwise
;W =
1
4I (I   1) .
To see that the belief of agent i is well defined, note that the number of elements
42
in 
(I 1)W is I , hence there are I states which are put with probability (I   1)W .
Since there is only one state with probability (2I (I   1)  1)W , the number of the
states with probability W is I2 + 2   I   1 = I (I   1) + 1. Thus,
X
!2

i (!) =
I  (I   1)W + 1 (2I (I   1)  1)W + (I (I   1) + 1)W = 4I (I   1)W = 1.
The equilibrium with the prices and trades given below is what we look for - the one in
which there is a strong and common expected bubble in period 1 in state !
I2+1
.
P1 (!) = 18! 2 
.
P2 (!n) =

0 if n = I2 + 1 or n = I2 + 2
2 otherwise .
P3 (!n) =

4 if n 2 
D
0 otherwise .
8i = 1; 2;    ; I;8! 2 
; xi1 (!) = xi3 (!) = 0.
xi2 (!n) =
8<: I   1 if !n 2 
i0 if n = I2 + 1 or n = I2 + 2 1 otherwise 8i = 1; 2;    ; I .
Observe that neither the prices nor the trades reveal any addition information with the
settings above.
It can be similarly checked following the procedures described in the two-agent
example that the above prices and trades constitute a rational expectations equilibrium.
And since in period 1 in state !
I2+1
, each agent knows that he will receive nothing at the
end of period 3, given the positive price of 1 in period 1, there exists a strong bubble in this
equilibrium.
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Note that mPX1 (!
I2+1
) = 
. To see that this bubble is robust to common knowledge
in the expected sense, we need to check that 8i = 1; 2;    ; I;8! 2 
; 1 >
1X
!02sPX
i1
(!)
i(!0)
X
!02sPXi1 (!)
i (!
0) d (!0). Note that for agent 1, either he will observe
f!Iki ; !I2+1g, or he will observe 
n f!Iki ; !I2+1g. If it is the first case, his expected
dividend will be 1
2
0 + 1
2
0 = 0; If it is the second case, his expected dividend will be
2(I 1)
4I(I 1) 24 +
4I(I 1) 2 2(I 1)
4I(I 1) 2 0 =
4
2I  1
I 1
. In either case, the expected dividend is less than
the price. Therefore, the bubble in period 1 in state !
I2+1
is a common expected bubble.
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Chapter 2 When Can Forgetfulness Make Us Better Off?
2.1 Introduction
Since Akerlof’s famous 1970 paper on lemon market, the problem of asymmetric
information has been a hot research topic among economists. There is huge literature on
the value of information, as well as the cost of information acquisition. Most of the papers
in this category build a positive relationship between information and welfare: the more
informative players become, the better off they are. Among these few exceptions, Levin
(2001) revisits the lemon market and finds the surprising result that greater information
asymmetries do not necessarily reduce the gains from trade. According to Levin (2001),
better information on the selling side may worsen the welfare while better information
on the buying side unambiguously improves trade. In this paper, by making slightly
different assumptions, we show in a trade game example that even on the buying side more
information does not lead to a better result. Moreover, this surprising result is not restricted
to the lemon market; it is true in a more general setting. By studying the situations where
rational players choose to remain ignorant even though the information acquisition is free,
we can better understand how people behave in the world of incomplete information.
Behind some seemingly weird thoughts, there may exist a rational mind. It is not always
beneficial to know everything; sometimes being forgetful might make people better off.
The next section of the paper investigates three simple examples where forgetfulness
does make players better off. Section 3 presents a general setup of the game where players
47
are allowed to have imperfect memory, and characterizes necessary conditions for the
existence of ration ignorance. Conclusions are drawn and Directions for future work are
pointed out in the last section.
2.2 Simple Examples
2.2.1 A Trade Game
There are 2 states (!1 and !2), 2 periods (t1 and t2), and 2 players (A and B).
Both players assign equal probability to !1 and !2. Players receive different utilities
from consumption across different states. Player A’s marginal utility is 2 for every dollar
of consumption made in !1 and 1 in !2. Player B’s marginal utility is 1 in !1 and 3 in !2.
In other words, Player A values the consumption twice as much as player B does in !1,
and player B values the consumption three times as much as player A does in !2.
Player A initially owns an asset and some money mA. At the end of t2, the asset pays
nothing in !1 and $1 in !2. Player B initially owns mB of money and has no asset.
In period t1, player A offers a price P at which he is willing to sell the asset to player
B. In period t2, player B decides whether to accept or to reject player A’s offer. At the
end of period t2, all the information becomes perfect, and the game ends.
Initially players may have private information on which state is realized, and they can
learn additional information from the actions of the other player.
We also assume that players may have an option to be forgetful in a sense that they may
not remember the state information they knew before.
2.2.1.1 Case 1: SA0 = SB0 = ff!1; !2gg
In this case, neither player A nor B has any information about the true state at the
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beginning of the game. So they will choose the actions which maximize their expected
utilities given any information they may possibly have.
At period t1, since player A cannot tell the difference between !1 and !2, his action
(the price P he offers to player B) reveals no information to player B. Therefore, at period
t2, player B still knows nothing about the true state, and hence his expected value of the
asset is 1
2
 1 0+ 1
2
 3 1 = 3
2
. Let PB be the highest price of the asset at which player
B would like to buy. Then we have 1
2
 1 PB + 12  3 PB = 32 , or PB = 34 . This tells
us that Player B’s best response to player A’s action is
Accept if P 6 3
4
Reject if P > 3
4
Now let’s consider player A’s problem. At period t1, his expected value of the asset is
1
2
 2  0 + 1
2
 1  1 = 1
2
. Let PA be the lowest price of the asset at which player A
would like to sell. Then we have 1
2
 2  PA + 12  1  PA = 12 , or PA = 13 . This tells
us that as long as P > 1
3
, player A can benefit from the trade, and if the trade happens,
the higher the price P is, the better off player A can be. Given player B’s best response,
player A should set P equal to 3
4
.
The equilibrium outcome will be (1) in period t1, player A offers that he is willing to
sell the asset at price P = 3
4
; (2) in period t2, player B accepts the offer.
The equilibrium payoff for playerA is 1
2
2 mA + 34+ 121 mA + 34 = 32mA+ 98 ,
and the equilibrium payoff for playerB is 1
2
1 mB   34+123 mB   34 + 1 = 2mB.
2.2.1.2 Case 2: SA0 = ff!1g ; f!2gg ; SB0 = ff!1; !2gg
In this case, initially player A knows the true state and player B knows nothing. Player
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A may choose to be forgetful, then the result will be exactly the same as in case 1. Player
A’s payoff is 3
2
mA +
9
8
and Player B’s payoff is 2mB.
Now let’s suppose that player A chooses to remember the information he has initially.
If the true state is !1, the asset is valueless. In period t1 player A immediately knows
this and hence he is willing to sell the asset at any possible positive price.
If the true state is !2, the asset is worth 1 dollar. In period t1 player A immediately
knows this and hence he is willing to sell the asset at any price no less than 1, and won’t
sell the asset at any price less than 1.
There are two subcases:
(1) If player A offers the same price in both !1 and !2, then his action reveals no
information to player B. Player B is in the same situation as before. Hence player B will
reject any price higher than 3
4
. However, from the analysis above, we already know that
player A will offer a price no less than 1. Therefore, there will be no trade in this case.
In fact this cannot be an equilibrium outcome since in !1 player A will have incentive to
deviate by offering a price of 3
4
.
(2) If player A offers different prices in different states, then his action reveals full
information on states to player B. At period t2, when player B decides whether to accept
or to reject player A’s offer, he surely knows the true state, and hence the true value of the
asset. Therefore, Player B’s best response to player A’s action is
In !1, Accept if P (!1)  0 and Reject if P (!1) > 0
In !2, Accept if P (!2)  1 and Reject if P (!2) > 1
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Therefore, the equilibrium outcome will either be no trade, or the asset is sold at the
price of its true value, which will not make anyone better off.
The equilibrium payoff for player A is 1
2
 2mA + 12  1 (mA + 1) = 32mA + 12 ,
and the equilibrium payoff for player B is 1
2
 1mB + 12  3mB = 2mB.
Comparing player A’s equilibrium payoffs whether he chooses to forget or not, we
come up with a surprising result: Player A has an incentive to be forgetful in our example.
Put it in another way, if we allowed player A to have access to the information about the
true state at the first beginning, he would rather not knowing that. In this example, less
information makes player A strictly better off and player B as good as before. So the total
welfare is improved by player A being forgetful.
Proposition 10 For the set of trade games (
;Si;0;MUi) with j
j  2 and  (!) = 1j
j
8! 2 
, if 9!1; !2 2 
; !1 6= !2; MUA(!1)d1+MUA(!2)d2MUA(!1)+MUA(!2) <
MUB(!1)d1+MUB(!2)d2
MUB(!1)+MUB(!2)
, and
d1 6= d2, then there always exists some information structure under which playerA chooses
to be forgetful in equilibrium.
Proof. We prove by construction. Let SA0 = ff!1g ; f!2gg [ S A0 and SB0 =
f!1; !2g [ S B0, where S A0 and S B0 can be any partition over 
n f!1; !2g. It suffices to
show that when the event f!1; !2g occurs, player A chooses to be forgetful in equilibrium.
Similar analysis gives us PB = MUB(!1)d1+MUB(!2)d2MUB(!1)+MUB(!2) and PA =
MUA(!1)d1+MUA(!2)d2
MUA(!1)+MUA(!2)
.
Without loss of generality, assume d1 < d2. Then we have d1 < PA < PB < d2.
If player A chooses to forget when the event f!1; !2g occurs, the equilibrium outcome
will be (1) in period t1, player A offers that he is willing to sell the asset at price PB;
(2) in period t2, player B accepts the offer. The equilibrium payoff for player A will be
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1
2
MUA (!1)(mA + PB)+12MUA (!2)(mA + PB) = MUA(!1)+MUA(!2)2 (mA + PB).
If player A chooses to remember when the event f!1; !2g occurs, the equilibrium
outcome will either be no trade, or the asset is sold at the price of its true value, which will
not make anyone better off. The equilibrium payoff for player A will be 1
2
MUA (!1)
(mA + d1)+
1
2
MUA (!2) (mA + d2) = MUA(!1)+MUA(!2)2 mA+ MUA(!1)d1+MUA(!2)d22 .
To show that MUA(!1)+MUA(!2)
2
PB >
MUA(!1)d1+MUA(!2)d2
2
, it suffices to show that
PB >
MUA(!1)d1+MUA(!2)d2
MUA(!1)+MUA(!2)
. This is true since MUA(!1)d1+MUA(!2)d2
MUA(!1)+MUA(!2)
= PA and PB > PA.
2.2.2 A Cooperation Game
There are 2 states (!1 and !2) and 2 players (A and B).
Player A and B work on a public good project together. Only both of them make
positive efforts, can the public good be produced. For each player, the effort e can be any
real number between 0 and 1. y =

yA + yB if eA  eB > 0
0 if eA  eB = 0
Both players can be good workers or bad workers. If player i is a good worker, his
effort ei will contribute yi = 2ei to the output of the public good. If player i is a bad
worker, his effort ei will contribute yi = 12ei to the output of the public good. The output
y = yA + yB is divided between players according to their contribution. A player’s payoff
will be his share of the public good minus his effort. ui = yiyi+y iy   ei.
In !1 player A is a good worker and player B is a bad worker. It is the other way round
for state !2. Both players assign equal probability to !1 and !1.
Initially players may have private information on which state is realized, and they can
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learn additional information from the actions of the other player.
We also assume that players may have an option to be forgetful in a sense that they may
not remember the state information they knew before.
state !1 state !2
B B
E N E N
A E
 
eA; 12eB

( eA; 0) A E
  1
2
eA; eB

( eA; 0)
N (0; eB) (0; 0) N (0; eB) (0; 0)
2.2.2.1 Case 1: SA0 = SB0 = ff!1; !2gg
In this case, neither player A nor B has any information about the true state at the
beginning of the game. In other words, they don’t know they are good workers or bad
workers. So they will choose the actions which maximize their expected payoffs.
If a player chooses not to make efforts, his payoff is 0. If a player chooses to make
effort e, then his payoff will be 2e   e if he is a good worker and 1
2
e   e if he is a bad
worker. Therefore, his expected payoff will be 1
2
(2e  e) + 1
2
 
1
2
e  e = 1
4
e. Now we can
write the payoff matrix as:
B
E N
A E
 
1
4
eA;
1
4
eB

( eA; 0)
N (0; eB) (0; 0)
It is easy to see from the above payoff matrix that there are two pure strategy Nash
Equilibria: (eA = 1; eB = 1) and (N;N). And the mixed strategy Nash Equilibrium is
each player making effort e = 1 with probability 3
4
and making no effort with probability
1
4
.
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The equilibrium we are interested in is the one where both players are making full
efforts. In this case, the public good is produced at the maximum quantity level and each
of the players receives a payoff of 1
4
.
2.2.2.2 Case 2: SA0 = ff!1g ; f!2gg ; SB0 = ff!1; !2gg
In this case, initially player A knows the true state and player B knows nothing. Player
A may choose to be forgetful, then the result will be exactly the same as in case 1. The
maximum payoff level each of them can achieve is 1
4
.
Now let’s suppose that player A chooses to remember the information he has initially.
If the true state is !2, player A knows that he is a bad worker. As a bad worker, he will
always receive a negative payoff if he makes positive efforts, no matter what player B’s
action is. And if he does not make an effort, he will have a payoff of 0. Understanding
this, player A will surely choose not to make effort, since this is his dominant strategy.
If the true state is !1, player A knows that he is a good worker. As a good worker he
will choose to make effort if player B chooses to make effort, and he will choose not to
make effort if player B chooses not to. But if player A chooses to make effort, then his
action in state !1 will be different from his action in state !2. Then player B can learn the
true state from player A’s actions. Once player B knows that the true state is !1, he knows
he himself is a bad worker, and not making effort will be his dominant strategy. Given that
player B’s strategy, player A will not make effort from the beginning.
Therefore in both states, player A will not make effort. Given that player A makes
no effort, player B best response is not to make effort. The equilibrium outcome will be
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(N;N), and both of the players receive 0 payoffs.
Comparing player A’s equilibrium payoffs whether he chooses to forget or not, we see
that player A can be better off if he chooses to forget his private information about the true
state. In this example, less information makes both player A and player B strictly better
off. The total welfare is improved by player A being forgetful.
2.2.2.3 Case 3: SA0 = SB0 = ff!1g ; f!2gg
In this case, initially both players know the true state.
If player B chooses to be forgetful, the situation will be the same as in case 2. And in
this case we know that player A will also choose to be forgetful. By symmetry, the same
result holds if player A chooses to be forgetful. This tells us that given the other player
being forgetful, a player will be better off by being forgetful. The equilibrium payoff is 1
4
for both players.
If both players choose to remember, then the payoff matrix is the following:
state !1 state !2
B B
E N E N
A E
 
eA; 12eB

( eA; 0) A E
  1
2
eA; eB

( eA; 0)
N (0; eB) (0; 0) N (0; eB) (0; 0)
It is easy to see from the above payoff matrix that (1) in state !1 player B has a
dominant strategy of making no effort, and (2) in state !2 player A has a dominant strategy
of making no effort. Therefore, in both states, there will be a unique Nash Equilibrium
(N;N), where both players make no efforts. The equilibrium payoff is 0 for both players.
Given the above results, a new payoff matrix regarding forgetfulness can be constructed
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as below:
B
Forget Remember
A Forget
 
1
4
; 1
4

(0; 0)
Remember (0; 0) (0; 0)
It is also easy to see from the above new payoff matrix that being forgetful weekly
dominates having private information. Hence one Nash Equilibrium is (Forget; Forget),
where both players choose to forget private information they initially knew.
Proposition 11 For the set of cooperation games (
;Si;0;ui) with j
j  2, if 9!1; !2 2

; !1 6= !2, yA (!1) > (!1)yA(!1)+(!2)yA(!2)(!1)+(!2) > eA > yA (!2) > 0 and yB (!2) >
(!1)yB(!1)+(!2)yB(!2)
(!1)+(!2)
> eB > yB (!1) > 0, then there always exists some information
structure under which both players choose to be forgetful in equilibrium.
Proof. We prove by construction. Let SA0 = ff!1g ; f!2gg [ S A0 and SB0 =
ff!1g ; f!2gg [ S B0, where S A0 and S B0 can be any partition over 
n f!1; !2g. It suffices
to show that when the event f!1; !2g occurs, both player A and player B choose to be
forgetful in equilibrium. Here is the matrix of the game with perfect state information
when the event f!1; !2g occurs.
state !1 state !2
B B
E N E N
A E (yA (!1)  eA; yB (!1)  eB) ( eA; 0) E (yA (!2)  eA; yB (!2)  eB) ( eA; 0)
N (0; eB) (0; 0) N (0; eB) (0; 0)
And here is the matrix of the game with no state information when the event f!1; !2g
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occurs.
B
E N
A E

(!1)yA(!1)+(!2)yA(!2)
(!1)+(!2)
  eA; (!1)yB(!1)+(!2)yB(!2)(!1)+(!2)   eB

( eA; 0)
N (0; eB) (0; 0)
An analysis similar to the one for the second example gives the result that both player
A and player B choose to be forgetful in equilibrium.
2.2.3 An Example of Common Strong Bubbles with Agents of Imperfect Memory
2.2.3.1 Common Strong Bubbles
AMP (1993) has shown a strong bubble in a rational expectations equilibrium of a
three-period three-agent economy with the assumption of no common knowledge of
trades. Conlon (2004) strengthens this result by giving an example of strong bubbles
robust to higher order knowledge with two agents where trades become automatically
common knowledge. In this section, I will provide a simple example of the existence of
strong bubbles robust to common knowledge. The only modification in assumptions I have
made is that agents can have imperfect memory now.
Definition 9 (Strong Bubble) As in AMP (1993), a strong bubble is said to exist in state
! at period t if in state ! it is mutual knowledge that the price of the risky asset at t is
higher than the possible dividend agents will receive, that is
8i = 1; 2;    ; I;8!0 2 sPXit (!) 22; Pt (!) > d (!0)
Definition 10 (Common Strong Bubble) As in Zheng (2009), a common strong bubble
is said to exist in state ! at period t if in state ! it is common knowledge that the price of
the risky asset at t is higher than the possible dividend agents will receive, that is
8!0 2 mPXt (!) 23; Pt (!) > d (!0)
22 At the beginning of each period t, before observing the current price and making the trade, agent i’s
information about the state is represented by Sit, a partition of the space 
, and his price–and-trade-refined
information is represented by SPXit . We denote by sit (!) (sPXit (!)) the partition member in Sit (SPXit )
containing the state !.
23 mPXt (!) is the meet of sPX1t (!) ; sPX2t (!) ;    ; sPXIt (!).
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2.2.3.2 Exogenous Setting
There are 2 agents (A and B), 3 periods (1, 2, and 3) and 8 states (!1, !2, !3, !4, !5,
!6, !7 and !8). There are only 2 assets: money and the risky asset. Each share of the risky
asset will pay a dividend of amount 4 at the end of period 3 if the state is either !1 or !4,
and will pay nothing otherwise, as shown in the table below.
State !1 !2 !3 !4 !5 !6 !7 !8
d (!) 4 0 0 4 0 0 0 0
Each agent is endowed with mi unit of money and 1 share of the risky asset at the
beginning of period 1. Agents can trade in each of period 1, 2, and 3. At period 3, after
the trade is made, the dividend is realized, and then the consumption takes place. The
state-and-period-dependent price of the risky asset is denoted by Pt (!). Agent i’s net
trade at period t in state ! is denoted by xit (!), and we write xi = (xi1; xi2;    ; xiT ),
xt = (x1t; x2t;    ; xIt) and x = (x1; x2;    ; xI). Hence agent i’s final consumption
in state ! with net trades xi at price P (!) = (P1 (!) ; P2 (!) ;    ; PT (!)), denoted
by yi (!; P (!) ; xi), is equal to mi + eiPT (!) +
TX
t=1
xit (!) [Pt+1 (!)  Pt (!)], where
PT+1 (!) = d (!). Assume that all agents have utiity function u (y) = y. Then agent i’s
utility in state ! with net trades xi at price P (!), is yi (!; P (!) ; xi).
Keeping in mind that the asymmetric information is the key to generate bubbles, we
achieve this goal by giving agents different information structures. Remind that agent i’s
(i = A;B) information about the state in period t (t = 1; 2; 3) is represented by Sit, a
partition of the space 
. The specific structures of Sit’s are given below.
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In period 1, both agents receive the same information, represented by SA1 and SB1
respectively, where SA1 = SB1. When it comes to period 2, both agents forget everything
they knew in period 1, and then they get to receive some new information, represented by
SA2 and SB2 respectively. In this case, Si2 is no longer necessarily a finer partition than Si1
is, for i = A;B. In period 3, again as before, each agent is perfectly informed of what the
realized state is. The structure for the information partitions is shown in the table below.
SA1 = SB1 = ff!2; !3; !5; !6; !8g ; f!1; !4; !7gg
SA2 = ff!1; !2; !3g ; f!4; !5g ; f!6; !7g ; f!8gg
SB2 = ff!4; !5; !6g ; f!1; !2g ; f!3; !7g ; f!8gg
SA3 = SB3 = ff!1g ; f!2g ; f!3g ; f!4g ; f!5g ; f!6g ; f!7g ; f!8gg
The following graph may give more intuition about the information structure than the
mathematical expression does. In the graph, agent A’s information sets are described by
the black solid curves; agent B’s information sets are described by the blue dotted curves;
dividend paying states are emphasized in gray color.
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Figure 2:1: 3-Period Information Structure with Impefect Memory
The heterogeneous belief about the probability distribution of the state, for each agent,
is shown in the table below with weight W = 1
16
.
State !1 !2 !3 !4 !5 !6 !7 !8
A 2 1 1 1 2 1 3 5
B 1 2 1 2 1 1 3 5
2.2.3.3 A Rational Expectations Equilibrium with Common Strong Bubbles
A rational expectations equilibrium will be a vector (P; x) 2 R38+ R238 such that
(C1) 8i = A;B, xi are information feasible24 and satisfy no short sales25.
(C2) 8i = A;B, xi maximizes player i’s expected payoff with respect to his own
24 xi are information feasible if 8t = 1; 2;    ; T;8! 2 
; sPXit (!)  f!0 : xit (!0) = xit (!)g
25 xi satisfy no short sales if 8t = 1; 2;    ; T;8! 2 
; ei +
tX
s=0
xit (!)  0
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price-and-trade-refined information.
(C3) 8t = 1; 2; 3;8n = 1;    ; 8; xAt (!n) + xBt (!n) = 0.
(C4) 8t = 1; 2; 3;8n;m = 1;    ; 8; jt (!n)  f!m : Pt (!m) = Pt (!n)g.
A simple calculation and check procedure will show that the above economy has a
rational expectations equilibrium, which is characterized by the price table and the trade
table below.
State !1 !2 !3 !4 !5 !6 !7 !8
P1 (!) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
P2 (!) 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 0
P3 (!) 4 0 0 4 0 0 0 0
8! 2 
; xA1 (!) = xB1 (!) = xA3 (!) = xB3 (!) = 0
State !1 !2 !3 !4 !5 !6 !7 !8
xA2 (!) 1 1 1  1  1  1 0 0
xB2 (!)  1  1  1 1 1 1 0 0
xA2 (!) + xB2 (!) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Now it is time to look for the common strong bubbles in such an equilibrium. Observe
that at period 1 in any state from the set f!2; !3; !5; !6; !8g, it is common knowledge that
the dividend at period 3 will be 0. Given a positive price 1, it is exactly the case that it is
common knowledge that the price of the risky asset is higher than the possible dividend
agents will receive, and hence there is a common strong bubble at period 1 in any state
from the set f!2; !3; !5; !6; !8g.
This example shows that under the imperfect memory assumption the standard result
of nonexistence of common strong bubbles is no longer valid. In the real world, it is
arguable that not all people have perfect memory. Therefore, a common strong bubble may
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exist in an economy of the real life. This seems to be a surprising result, and it provides
an alternative explanation of the existence of bubbles by the assumption of imperfect
memory, instead of the assumption of noise traders. Another surprising finding with this
example is that agents’ welfare actually improves when they are assumed forgetful, which
is also observed in the previous two examples. The last thing worth pointing out in this
example is that if we allowed agents to be forgetful rather than exogenously assume they
are forgetful, they would actually choose to be forgetful in equilibrium, where there is a
common strong bubble.
2.3 The Model
2.3.1 Basic Setting
There are a finite set of players I = f1; 2;    ; Ig and a finite set of states 
 =
f!1; !2;    ; !Ng. The horizon is finite too, denoted by periods: T = ft1; t2;    ; tTg.
Player i’s action at period t is denoted by ai;t. 8t 2 T; at 2 At =
Q
i2I
Ai;t, where At is
finite. For simplicity, assume that 8t 2 T;8i; j 2 I , Ai;t = Aj;t = At. This simply means
that all the players share the same action space over time.
Each player i has a subjective belief about the probability distribution of the state,
denoted by i (!). 8i 2 I; 8! 2 
; i (!) > 0. (Better to assume different marginal
utilities??)
2.3.1.1 Information Structure
The information structure for player i at period t is represented by a mathematical
partition Si;t over the state space 
. We denote by sit (!) the partition member in Sit
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containing the state !. 8i 2 I; t 2 T; si;t : 
 ! 2
n. In other words, sit (!) consists of
all the possible states player i believes he might be in when the state ! is realized at period
t. For example, si1 (!1) = f!1; !2g means that at period 1 player i believes he might be
either in !1 or !2 when !1 is realized.
The following are some simple features with respect to the information structure:
(1) 8!; !0 2 
; si;t (!) 6= si;t (!0)) si;t (!) \ si;t (!0) = 
(2) S
!2

si;t (!) = 

(3) Si;t  fsi;t (!) : ! 2 
g
At the beginning of period t, player i receives some private information, represented
by S0i;t. Hence the information player i has at the beginning of period t is the total of
his private information at period t and the information he has at the end of period t   1.
Si;t = S
0
i;t
T
SRi;t 1.
A player’s strategy consists of two components: information strategy and action
strategy.
A player’s information strategy, denoted by Pi;t, is a map from the information profile
at the beginning of period t to the set of partitions over the state space 
. Let pi;t (!) be
the partition member in Pi;t (St) containing the state !. 8i 2 I; t 2 T; 8! 2 
; pi;t (!) 
si;t (!). This simply means that players can choose to forget some information on
the states at the beginning of each period of time. Let Pt = (P1;t; P2;t;    ; PI;t) and
P = (P1; P2;    ; PI)
A player’s action strategy, denoted by i;t, is a function from his information strategy
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to his action space. 8i 2 I; t 2 T; i;t : Pi;t ! Ai. Let t = (1;t; 2;t;    ; I;t) and
 = (1; 2;    ; I).
A player’s payoff is a real-valued function dependent on both states and all the players’
strategies over the time. ui : 

Q
t2T
t ! R.
2.3.1.2 Strategic Learning
Players are assumed to be smart in a sense that they can actively learn state information
from how other players behave and the learning has an immediate effort on players’
behaves. We assume that 8t 2 T , the additional information revealed from actions is
public, denoted by sa;t. sa;t : Kt ! 2
n, where Kt is the largest subset of 
  At such
that 8 (!; at) ; (!0:a0t) 2 Kt; at 6= a0t ) ! 6= !0.
We assume the additional information must satisfy the following conditions:
(4) 8 (!; at) ; (!0:a0t) 2 Kt; at 6= a0t ) sa;t (!; at) \ sa;t (!0; a0t) = 
(5) 8 (!; at) ; (!0:a0t) 2 Kt; at = a0t ) sa;t (!; at) = sa;t (!0; a0t)
(6) 8 (!; at) ; (!0:a0t) 2 Kt; sa;t (!; at) 6= sa;t (!0; a0t)) sa;t (!; at) \ sa;t (!0; a0t) = 
(7) S
(!;at)2Kt
sa;t (!; at) = 

The partition based on the additional information at period t is denoted by Sa;t, where
Sa;t  fsa;t (!; at) : (!; at) 2 Ktg. The refined information for player i at period t,
denoted by SRi;t, is the total of his private information updated by the information strategy
and the additional information. SRi;t = Pi;t
T
Sa;t. Let sRi;t (!) be the partition member in
SRi;t containing the state !.
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2.3.1.3 Imperfect Memory
The concept of information strategy captures the key idea of imperfect memory. Player
i is forgetful at period t, if Si;t  Pi;t (St) (Pi;t (St) is coarser than Si;t). Under this
assumption, a player’s information partition can be coarser and coarser over the time when
the player chooses to be forgetful, as opposed to what is assumed in the standard literature.
Just to put an emphasis on this assumption, we write down these observations below.
8! 2 
;8t1; t2 2 T;
t1 < t2 ; pi;t2 (!)  pi;t1 (!)
8! 2 
;8t1; t2 2 T; 8 (!; at1) 2 Kt1 ;8 (!; at2) 2 Kt2 ;
t1 < t2 ; sa;t2 (!; at2)  sa;t1 (!; at1)
2.3.2 Equilibrium
Now we are ready to give the definition of an Equilibrium for this game.
Definition 11 (P; ) is an equilibrium of the game (I; 
;T ;A; ;S;u) if
8i 2 I; (Pi; i) 2 argmax
P 0i ;
0
i
Ei(!);!2


ui (!; 
0
i;  i) jSRi;1

It is worth noting that in the above expression, the information strategy P 0i affects
payoff not only through the action strategy 0i, but also through the refined information
partition SRi;1.
Proposition 12 (Existence) There exists an equilibrium (P; ), defined above, for the
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game (I; 
;T ;A; ;S;u).
Proof. The game has finite number of players, states, periods and actions, hence an
equilibrium always exists.
2.3.3 Necessary Conditions
Proposition 13 If in equilibrium player i has strong incentive to be forgetful, then there
must exist another player j such that i and j have negatively correlated preferences. Here,
the negatively correlated preferences between i and j means that, 9!; !0 2 
, b 2 Ai, c 2
Aj , ui (!; ai = b; aj = c;    ) > ui (!0; ai = b; aj = c;    ) and uj (!; ai = b; aj = c;    ) <
uj (!
0; ai = b; aj = c;    ).
Proof. Suppose not. Then for any player j other than i, i and j do not have negatively cor-
related preferences. This means 8!; !0 2 
, b 2 Ai, c 2 Aj , ui (!; ai = b; aj = c;    ) >
ui (!
0; ai = b; aj = c;    ) implies uj (!; ai = b; aj = c;    )  uj (!0; ai = b; aj = c;    ).
This indicates that the action profile chosen by players in equilibrium in state ! will be
exactly the same as the action profile chosen in equilibrium in state !0. In this case, no
matter how much information players have, the equilibrium remains the same. Therefore,
player i will have no strong incentive to be forgetful, which causes the contradiction.
Proposition 14 If in equilibrium player i has strong incentive to be forgetful at period t,
then it must be the case that i’ actions would reveal additional information if he chose not
to be forgetful. That is SRi;t 6= Pi;t.
Proof. We prove by contradiction. Suppose not. Then there exists an equilibrium (P; )
where Si;t  Pi;t (St) such that
(1) Ei(!);!2


ui (!; i;  i) jSRi;1

> Ei(!);!2


ui (!; 
0
i;  i) jSRi;1
 8P 0i;t 6= Pi;t and
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(2) SRj;t = Pj;t.
Now consider player i at period t. If he chooses not to be forgetful, then his expected
payoff will be
Ei(!);!2


ui (!; i (Si;t) ;  i (P i;t)) jSRi;t

= Ei(!);!2
 [ui (!; i (Si;t) ;  i (P i;t)) jSi;t],
since SRi;t = Pi;t (St) = Si;t.
If he chooses to be forgetful, then his expected payoff will be
Ei(!);!2


ui (!; i (Pi;t) ;  i (P i;t)) jSRi;t

= Ei(!);!2
 [ui (!; i (Pi;t) ;  i (P i;t)) jPi;t].
It is easy to see that
Ei(!);!2
 [ui (!; i (Si;t) ;  i (P i;t)) jSi;t]  Ei(!);!2


ui (!; i (Pi;t) ;  i (P i;t)) jSRi;t

since Si;t  Pi;t. This gives a contradiction to (1).
2.4 Conclusion
The relationship between information and welfare is not necessarily positive. In some
situations, people have strong incentive to remain ignorant even though the learning is
costless. This paper tries to establish a general model to study the behavior of rational
ignorance, and two necessary conditions for rational ignorance in symmetric games are
provided. These results will have important applications in policy design: it might be
desirable to have social institutions under which some records are destroyed after a period
of time.
For future work, it would be both important and interesting to characterize more
features of the rational ignorant phenomenon. We also seek to find sufficient conditions
for players being forgetful in equilibrium, if there is any. A more accurate and complete
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answer to the question about the relationship between how much we know and how well
off we are would lead to a better understanding of how people behave in the real world.
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Chapter 3 The Robustness of Bubbles in a Finite Horizon Model
3.1 Introduction
The robustness of bubbles has been one of the important and diffcult topics in the study
of bubbles in asset markets. On the one hand side, we do see many economic phenomena
presenting bubble features (for instance, internet bubbles and housing bubbles) in the
real world persist for a long time period. On the other hand side, most economic models
of bubbles are not very robust to perturbations. In other word, the existence of bubbles
in these models requires strong conditions to be satisfied, and the bubbles will easily
disappear if small changes in the parameters occur. Therefore, economists have been
looking for a model of bubbles with the robustness feature, which can better interprete the
real world phenomena.
Among all the models of bubbles, Allen, Morris and Postlewaite (1993) and Abreu
and Brunnermeier (2003) are particularly two different frameworks that well explain
the bubble stories based on the assumptions of asymmetric information and short sales
constraints. However, these models do not present a roubustness feature. Under a small
perturbation of certain parameter in the environment, the bubble equilibrium can crash
immediately.
According to the author’s knowledge, Doblas-Madrid (2009) is the first to provide
a robust model of bubbles with multidimensional uncertainty based on the Abreu and
Brunnermeier (2003) framework. In the model, agents observe a noisy price that reflects a
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mix of noise and sales, and receive signals that indicate that the asset is over priced, but do
not know exactly when the bubble crashes. This multidimensional uncertainty leads to a
robust bubble equilibrium.
However, the finite horizon setting of Allen, Morris and Postlewaite (1993) is different
from the infinite horizonframeworks following Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003), hence
it is hard to construct a robust model based on Allen, Morris and Postlewaite (1993) by
simply borrowing the tricks in Doblas-Madrid (2009). Conlon (2010) proposes that the
introduction of continuum of states can lead to a robust bubble equilibrium where each
bad type of the seller pools with some good type of the seller.
In the following, we will first study the bubble examples in Zheng (2011) based
on Allen-Morris-Postlewaite model and focus on the symmetric case. We define two
class of symmetric perturbations: strongly symmetric perturbations and very symmetric
perturbations. Then we show that these bubbles are robust to both strongly symmetric
perturbations in beliefs and very symmetric perturbations in dividends, but not robust to
general perturbations.
In order to have a robust bubble example, we need to assume that the states are
continous rather than discrete. We construct a new three-period two-agent robust bubble
example where small variations in parameters do not eliminate the bubble equilibria. The
key idea is that in equilibrium each bad type of the seller pools with some good type of
the seller and hence it is impossible for the buyer to separate the bad states from the good
states. This provides a new answer to the question: How robust can rational bubbles be in
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a finite horizon model?
The next section of the essay introduces Zheng (2011)’s basic setting with discrete
states following AMP (1993). Section 3 defines the concept of symmetry and symetric
perturbation, and focuses on two certain classes of symmetric perturbations. Section 4
shows that the bubble example we described above is robust to both strongly symmetric
perturbations in beliefs and very symmetric perturbations in dividends. Section 5
constructs a continous-state example where the bubble is robust. Section 6 provides
concluding remarks and directions for further study.
3.2 The Discrete-State Model
3.2.1 Basic Setup
As in Zheng (2011), there are I ( 2) risk neutral26 agents (i = 1; 2;    ; I), T ( 3)
periods (t = 1; 2;    ; T ) and N ( 2) states of the world represented by ! 2 
. Only 2
assets exist in the market: one riskless (money) and the other risky. There is no discount
between any two periods. Each share of the risky asset will only pay a state-dependent
dividend denoted by d (!) at the end of period T .
Agent i is endowed with mi units of money and ei shares of the risky asset at
the beginning of period 1. In each period t and in each realized state !, agents
can exchange claims on the risky asset at a state-and-period-dependent price
Pt (!). Agent i’s net trade in period t when state ! is realized is denoted by
xit (!), and we write xi = (xi1; xi2;    ; xiT ), xt = (x1t; x2t;    ; xIt), and
26 Agents are assumed to be either risk averse or risk neutral in AMP (1993). Here for simplicity, I only
consider the case of risk neutrality. All the results will remain valid for the risk averse case as long as the
potential gain from trade is high enough.
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x = (x1; x2;    ; xI). Hence agent i’s final consumption in state ! with net trades xi at
price P (!) = (P1 (!) ; P2 (!) ;    ; PT (!)), denoted by yi (!; P (!) ; xi), is equal to
mi + eiPT (!) +
TX
t=1
xit (!) [Pt+1 (!)  Pt (!)], where PT+1 (!) = d (!). Let ui () be
agent i’s utility function. Then agent i’s utility in state ! with net trades xi at price P (!),
is ui(yi (!; P (!) ; xi)). For simplicity, assume that ui () is the identity function for all i.
Each agent i has a subjective belief about the probability distribution of the state,
denoted by i (!).27 8i = 1; 2;    ; I;8! 2 
; i (!) > 0.
3.2.2 Information Structure
At the beginning of each period t, before observing the current price and making the
trade, agent i’s information about the state is represented by Sit, a partition of the space

, and his price–and-trade-refined information is represented by SPXit .28 We denote by
sit (!) (sPXit (!)) the partition member in Sit (SPXit ) containing the state !. In other words,
sit (!) consists of all the possible states agent i believes he might be in when the state !
is realized in period t. For example, si1 (!1) = f!1; !2g means that in period 1 agent i
believes he might be either in !1 or !2 when !1 is realized.
SPXit is determined by (Sit; Pt; xt) such that
8! 2 
; sPXit (!) = sit (!) \ f!0jPt0 (!0) = Pt0 (!) and xt0 (!0) = xt0 (!) 8t0  tg .
27 We may either assume same utility function with heterogeneous beliefs, or assume common prior with
different utility functions, in order to give agents an incentive to trade. Here we adopt the former one and in
the next version we may also consider the latter. For other approaches to induce trade, see AMP (1993) for
details.
28 In the AMP (1993) model, they only focus on the price-refined information SPit . In their model it is assumed
that the trades are not common knowledge and hence agents cannot get additional information from trades.
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Obviously 8i = 1; 2;    ; I;8t = 1; 2;    ; T; 8! 2 
; f!g  sPXit (!)  sit (!).
We assume agents have perfect memory so that
8i = 1; 2;    ; I;8! 2 
;8t > t0; sit (!)  sit0 (!) .
Obviously this implies that
8i = 1; 2;    ; I;8! 2 
;8t > t0; sPXit (!)  sPXit0 (!) .
3.2.3 Rational Expectations Equilibrium
Definition 12 (Information Feasibility) Agent i’s net trades xi are information feasible
if in each period t, xit is measurable with respect to player i’s price–and-trade-refined
information, SPXit . Formally, xi are information feasible if
8t = 1; 2;    ; T; 8! 2 
; sPXit (!)  f!0 : xit (!0) = xit (!)g .
Definition 13 (No Short Sales) Agent i’s net trades xi satisfy no short sales if in each
period t and in each state ! agent i’s holdings of the risky asset are non-negative. Formally,
xi satisfy no short sales if
8t = 1; 2;    ; T; 8! 2 
; ei +
tX
s=0
xit (!)  0.
Denote by jt (!) the join of s1t (!) ; s2t (!) ;    ; sIt (!),29 and by mt (!) the meet of
s1t (!) ; s2t (!) ;    ; sIt (!).30
Definition 14 (Rational Expectations Equilibrium) (P; x) 2 RNT+ RINT is a Rational
Expectations Equilibrium if
(C1) 8i = 1; 2;    ; I , xi are information feasible and satisfy no short sales. Denote the
set of all such xi’s by Fi (ei; P; x i; Si), where Si = (Si1; Si2;    ; SiT );31
29 The join jt (!) of s1t (!) ; s2t (!) ;    ; sIt (!) is such that (1) 8i = 1; 2;    ; I; jt (!)  sit (!) and (2) for
all j0t (!) satisfying (1), j0t (!)  jt (!). It is also called the coarsest common refinement.
30 The meet mt (!) of s1t (!) ; s2t (!) ;    ; sIt (!) is such that (1) 8i = 1; 2;    ; I; sit (!)  mit (!) and
(2) for allm0t (!) satisfying (1),mt (!)  m0t (!). It is also called the finest common coarsening.
31 Since 8xi 2 Fi, xi are information feasible, Fi depends on the information structure Si, the prices P , and
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(C2) 8i = 1; 2;    ; I , xi 2 argmaxx0i2Fi(ei;P;x i;Si)
X
!2

i (!)ui(yi (!; P; x
0
i));
32
(C3) 8t = 1; 2;    ; T; 8! 2 
;
IX
i=1
xit (!) = 0;
(C4) 8t = 1; 2;    ; T; Pt () is measurable with respect to jt (!). Formally, 8t =
1; 2;    ; T; 8! 2 
; jt (!)  f!0 : Pt (!0) = Pt (!)g.
Basically, (C1) describes the feasible set of trade for each agent, (C2) says that each
agent maximizes his expected utility given his price-and-trade-refined information,
(C3) requires that the market should clear in equilibrium, and (C4) implies that all the
information contained in price is from the join of the individual information.
3.2.4 Different Concepts of Bubbles
Definition 15 (Expected Bubble) As in AMP (1993), an expected bubble is said to exist
in state ! in period t if in state ! it is mutual knowledge that the price of the risky asset in
period t is higher than the expected dividend an agent will receive, that is
8i = 1; 2;    ; I; Pt (!) > 1X
!02sPXit (!)
i (!0)
X
!02sPXit (!)
i (!
0) d (!0) .
Definition 16 (Strong Bubble) As in AMP (1993), a strong bubble is said to exist in state
! in period t if in state ! it is mutual knowledge that the price of the risky asset in period t
is higher than the maximum possible dividend an agent will receive, that is
8i = 1; 2;    ; I;8!0 2 sPXit (!) ; Pt (!) > d (!0) .
As seen from above, the concept of strong bubbles strengthens the concept of expected
bubbles in a way that it requires that the asset price be higher than the maximum possible
dividend, not just the expected dividend. As will be seen below, another way to strengthen
the concept of expected bubbles is to require common knowledge instead of mutual
other agents’ trades x i. Since xi satisfy no short sales, Fi depends on the endowment ei. That’s why it is
written as Fi (ei; P; x i; Si).
32 Another perhaps more intuitive way to express (C2) is (C2’) 8i = 1; 2;    ; I , xi 2 argmaxx0i2Fi(ei;P;x i;Si)
Ei

ui (yi (!; P; x
0
i)) jSPXi1

. It is easy to see that (C2’) is equivalent to (C2).
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knowledge. This requirement is reasonable since in the real world people’s behaviors do
not only depend on their own beliefs, but also depend on others’ beliefs, others’ beliefs on
their own beliefs, and so on. Therefore, we might expect to see something different when
common knowledge is introduced into the concept of bubbles.
Definition 17 (Common Expected Bubble) A common expected bubble is said to exist
in state ! in period t if in state ! it is common knowledge that the price of the risky asset
in period t is higher than the expected dividend an agent will receive, that is
8i = 1; 2;    ; I;8!0 2 mPXt (!) ; Pt (!) >
1X
!002sPXit (!0)
i (!00)
X
!002sPXit (!0)
i (!
00) d (!00) .7
3.3 Symmetric Perturbation
According to AMP (1993), by the nature of the model, such a bubble is not robust,
neither to perturbations in beliefs nor to perturbations in dividends. However, for an
economy with symmetric structure, we find that the equilibria with these bubbles, though
are not robust to perturbations in a general sense, but might be robust to perturbations in a
symmetric sense.
In this section, we focus on three-period models with a symmetric setting.
Definition 18 (Symmetry) The model has a symmetric setting if for any i; j = 1; 2;    ; I ,
there exists a bijective mapping L from f1; 2;    ; N = j
jg to f1; 2;    ; Ng such that for
any t = 1; 2; 3,
(1) Sit = SjtjL, where SjtjL is j’s relabelled information partition at t under L;
(2) i (!n) = j
 
!L(n)

;
(3) d (!n) = d
 
!L(n)

;
(4) (mi; ei) = (mj; ej) .
7 mPXt (!) is the meet of sPX1t (!) ; sPX2t (!) ;    ; sPXIt (!).
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Basically equation (1) means that it is information-symmetric. Similarly it is
belief-symmetric by (2), dividend-symmetric by (3), and endowment-symmetric by (4).
It should be noted that the symmetry assumption is more than assuming symmetry
w.r.t information, symmetry w.r.t. dividend, symmetry w.r.t. belief, and symmetry w.r.t.
endowment, respectively. That is because we require the same mapping L for conditions
(1)-(3) to be satisfied.
We call
 
!n; !L(n)

a symmetric pair of states for agent i and j if L (L (n)) = n.
Recall that a state where there is a strong bubble is called a bubble state, denoted by !.
A zero-dividend state is called a bubble-related state for agent i, denoted by !;i, if (1)
it is not a bubble state and (2) agent i cannot tell the difference between this state and the
bubble state in the first period. Note there may be more than one bubble-related state for
agent i.
A zero-dividend state is called a dummy state, !D, if when this state is realized (1) no
agents are sure about their future payoff in the first period and (2) all of them know that
the asset is worthless in the second period. A dummy state is necessary for a strong bubble
to exist in equilibrium in our model because of the equilibrium conditions.
In a three-period model, bubble bursts in the second period, which implies that in a
bubble state all agents know that the asset is worthless in the second period. This is the
same feature between bubble state and dummy state. The difference is that in the first
period in a bubble state all agents know that the asset is worthless while in a dummy state
they are not sure about the value of the asset.
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For instance, in the example of bubbles in Section 3, the setting is symmetric, and for
i = A; j = B, we have the relabelling function
L (n) =
8<: n+ 3 if n = 1; 2; 3n  3 if n = 4; 5; 6n if n = 7; 8 .
It is easy to see that (!1; !4), (!2; !5), (!3; !6) (!7; !7), (!8; !8) are symmetric pairs of
states. Here !7 is the bubble state, !6 is the bubble-related state for agent A, !3 is the
bubble-related state for agent B, and !8 is the dummy state.
Now we are ready to give a definition to the symmetric perturbation.
Definition 19 (Symmetric Perturbation) For a model with symmetric setting, a pertur-
bation  : 
 ! R is Symmetric if for any symmetric pair of states (!m; !n) ;m; n 2
f1; 2;    ; Ng,
 (!m) =  (!n) .
Even though mathematically symmetric perturbations are of measure zero when we
consider the whole family of perturbations, it does make economic sense to look at this
particular type of perturbations. First, economic systems function in a way that same
or similar shocks are received in symmetric states. Second, symmetric states may be
generated by the same fundamental factor, and hence should be perturbed by the same
amount.
In addition to symmetric perturbations, we can have even stronger concepts for
perturbations.
Definition 20 (Very Symmetric Perturbation) For a model with symmetric setting, a
perturbation  : 
! R is Very Symmetric if (1) it is Symmetric;
and (2) for the bubble state ! and the dummy state !D,
 (!) = 
 
!D

.
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It is straightforward to see from the definition that a very symmetric perturbation
requires same perturbations not only for a symmetric pair of states, but also for a pair
of bubble state and dummy state. Since in both bubble state and dummy state the asset
is worthless and this becomes agents’ mutual knowledge in the second period, it is
reasonable to think about the situation where the dividend perturbations for a pair of
bubble state and dummy state are the same.
Definition 21 (Strongly Symmetric Perturbation) For a model with symmetric setting,
a perturbation  : 
! R is Strongly Symmetric if (1) it is Symmetric;
(2) for the bubble state ! and the dummy state !D
 (!) =    !D ;
and (3) for any i = 1; 2;    ; I , for the bubble state ! and all the bubble-related state(s)
!;i
 (!)
i (!)
=
P
 (!;i)P
i (!;i)
.
A strongly symmetric perturbation is different from a very symmetric perturbation in
two ways. First, for the pair of bubble state and dummy state, the former requires the
same amount toward opposite directions while the latter requires the same amount toward
the same direction. Second, for the bubble state and all the bubble-related state(s), the
former requires the amount proportional on the prior while the latter has no restriction on
it. A strongly symmetric perturbation makes sense when we consider a perturbation in
beliefs. Condition (2) can be interpreted as the following: if you increase the probability
for the bubble state, you have to decrease the probability for the dummy state by the same
amount. Condition (3) is reasonable because it requires the perturbation in beliefs does not
affect agents’ beliefs of having a strong bubble when the bubble state is realized in the first
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period.
As will be shown next, these two particular types of symmetric perturbations are of our
interest because they play an important role in the robust analysis.
3.4 The Robustness Analysis for the Symmetric Case
To illustrate the results, we use the following example of bubbles in Zheng (2011) for
perturbation analysis.
There are 2 agents (A and B), 3 periods (1, 2, and 3) and 8 states (!1, !2, !3, !4, !5,
!6, !7 and !8). Only 2 assets exist in the market: one is money and the other is called
a risky asset. Each share of the risky asset will pay a dividend of amount 4 at the end of
period 3 if the state is either !1 or !4, and will pay nothing otherwise, as shown in the
table below.
State !1 !2 !3 !4 !5 !6 !7 !8
d (!) 4 0 0 4 0 0 0 0
Each agent is endowed with mi unit of money and 1 share of the risky asset at the
beginning of period 1. Agents can trade in each of period 1, 2, and 3. In period 3, after the
trade is made, the dividend is realized, and then the consumption takes place.
Agent i’s (i = A;B) information about the state in period t (t = 1; 2; 3) is represented
by Sit, a partition of the space 
. The specific structures of Sit’s are given by
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SA1 = ff!1; !2; !3; !4; !5; !8g ; f!6; !7gg
SB1 = ff!1; !2; !4; !5; !6; !8g ; f!3; !7gg
SA2 = ff!1; !2; !3g ; f!4; !5g ; f!6; !7g ; f!8gg
SB2 = ff!4; !5; !6g ; f!1; !2g ; f!3; !7g ; f!8gg
SA3 = SB3 = ff!1g ; f!2g ; f!3g ; f!4g ; f!5g ; f!6g ; f!7g ; f!8gg .
Agents have heterogeneous beliefs, as shown in the table below with weight W = 1
16
.
State !1 !2 !3 !4 !5 !6 !7 !8
A 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 7
B 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 7
Recall that the equilibrium is characterized by the price table and the trade table below.
State !1 !2 !3 !4 !5 !6 !7 !8
P1 (!) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
P2 (!) 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 0
P3 (!) 4 0 0 4 0 0 0 0
8! 2 
; xA1 (!) = xB1 (!) = xA3 (!) = xB3 (!) = 0
State !1 !2 !3 !4 !5 !6 !7 !8
xA2 (!) 1 1 1  1  1  1 0 0
xB2 (!)  1  1  1 1 1 1 0 0
xA2 (!) + xB2 (!) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
There are potentially two ways to make perturbations: one is through belief distribution
and the other is through dividend distribution.
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3.4.1 Belief Perturbation
State !1 !2 !3 !4 !5 !6 !7 !8
A 2 + "A;1 1 + "A;2 1 + "A;3 1 + "A;4 2 + "A;5 1 + "A;6 1 + "A;7 7 + "A;8
B 1 + "B;1 2 + "B;2 1 + "B;3 2 + "B;4 1 + "B;5 1 + "B;6 1 + "B;7 7 + "B;8
Suppose the original equilibrium is the one with a bubble in period 1 in state !7, which
was shown previously. Now for each state !n, the associated belief i (!n) (or denoted by
i;n for simplicity) for agent i(i = A;B) is perturbed by a very small amount "i;n, whereP
1n8 "i;n = 0, i = A;B. Suppose the information structure remains the same and the
agents trade the same way in the new equilibrium as before, then it suffices to have the
new equilibrium prices satisfy the following equations, denoted by BP .
P3 (!n) = dn; n = 1; 2;    8.
P2 (!n=1;2;3) =
d1 (A;1 + "A;1) + d2 (A;2 + "A;2) + d3 (A;3 + "A;3)
A;1 + A;2 + A;3 + "A;1 + "A;2 + "A;3
.
P2 (!n=4;5;6) =
d4 (B;4 + "B;4) + d5 (B;5 + "B;5) + d6 (B;6 + "B;6)
B;4 + B;5 + B;6 + "B;4 + "B;5 + "B;6
.
P2 (!n) = dn; n = 7; 8.
P1 (!n;1n8) =
P2 (!6) (A;6 + "A;6) + P2 (!7) (A;7 + "A;7)
A;6 + A;7 + "A;6 + "A;7
=
P2 (!3) (B;3 + "B;3) + P2 (!7) (B;7 + "B;7)
B;3 + B;7 + "B;3 + "B;7
=
P
1n8;n6=6;7 P2 (!n) (A;n + "A;n)P
1n8;n6=6;7 (A;n + "A;n)
=
P
1n8;n6=3;7 P2 (!n) (B;n + "B;n)P
1n8;n6=3;7 (B;n + "B;n)
.
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3.4.1.1 Strongly Symmetric Perturbations
If the perturbation is strongly symmetric, then by definition we have the following
conditions.
"A;1 = "B;4; "B;1 = "A;4;
"A;2 = "B;5; "B;2 = "A;5;
"A;3 = "B;6; "B;3 = "A;6;
"A;7 = "B;7; "A;8 = "B;8;
"A;6 = "A;7 =  "A;8.
Keep in mind that P2 (!7) = P2 (!8) = 0 in our example, which means that the
price of the asset is zero in both bubble state and dummy state in period 2. Note that
P2 (!
) = P2
 
!D

= 0 is not necessarily true in general, but it always holds for a
three-period model with a strong bubble in equilibrium.
Consider the prices specified below. It is easy to check that these prices automatically
satisfy the set of equations BP .
P3 (!n) = dn; n = 1; 2;    8.
P2 (!n;1n6) =
(
4(2+"A;1)
4+"A;1+"A;2+"A;3
if 1  n  6
0 if n = 7; 8
.
P1 (!n;1n8) =
2 (2 + "A;1)
4 + "A;1 + "A;2 + "A;3
.
This implies that we have found a new equilibrium with the above equilibrium prices.
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The last step is to check whether the coexistence of a strong bubble and a common expected
bubble is still true in period 1 in state !7. The answer is yes as long as the perturbation
is sufficiently small such that P1 > 67 ,
33 or  4"A;1 + 3"A;2 + 3"A;3 < 2. This can be
guaranteed by assuming maxi=A;B;1n8 j"i;nj < 15 . Therefore, the bubble in our example
is robust to any strongly symmetric perturbations in beliefs if maxi=A;B;1n8 j"i;nj < 15 .
It is also worth noting that this result can also be applied to a more general case where
the overpriced asset is not necessarily worthless. As long as the dividend in the bubble
state and dummy state are the same (d7 = d8), hence P2 (!7) = P2 (!8), then we still have
the same result.
3.4.2 Dividend Perturbation
State !1 !2 !3 !4 !5 !6 !7 !8
d (!) 4 + 1 2 3 4 + 4 5 6 7 8
Suppose the original equilibrium is the one we studied before. Now for each state
!n, the associated dividend dn is perturbed by a very small amount n. Suppose the
information structure remains the same and the agents trade the same way in the new
equilibrium as before, then it suffices to have the new equilibrium prices satisfy the
following equations, denoted by DP .
33 The number 67 was obtained when we check the existence of a common expected bubble in Section 3.
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P3 (!n) = dn + n; n = 1; 2;    ; 8.
P2 (!n=1;2;3) =
A;1 (d1 + 1) + A;2 (d2 + 2) + A;3 (d3 + 3)
A;1 + A;2 + A;3
.
P2 (!n=4;5;6) =
B;4 (d4 + 4) + B;5 (d5 + 5) + B;6 (d6 + 6)
B;4 + B;5 + B;6
.
P2 (!n) = dn + n; n = 7; 8.
P1 (!n;1n8) =
A;6P2 (!6) + A;7P2 (!7)
A;6 + A;7
=
B;3P2 (!3) + B;7P2 (!7)
B;3 + B;7
=
P
1n8;n6=6;7 A;nP2 (!n)P
1n8;n6=6;7 A;n
=
P
1n8;n6=3;7 B;nP2 (!n)P
1n8;n6=3;7 B;n
.
3.4.2.1 Very Symmetric Perturbations
If the perturbation is very symmetric, then by definition we have the following
equations.
1 = 4,
2 = 5,
3 = 6,
7 = 8.
Consider the prices specified below. It is easy to check that these prices automatically
satisfy the set of equations DP .
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P3 (!n) = dn + n; n = 1; 2;    8.
P2 (!n;1n6) =

2 + 21+2+3
4
if 1  n  6
n if n = 7; 8
.
P1 (!n;1n8) = 1 +
21 + 2 + 3 + 47
8
.
This implies that we have found a new equilibrium with the above equilibrium prices.
The last step is to check whether the coexistence of a strong bubble and a common
expected bubble is still true in period 1 in state !7. Similarly, the answer is yes as long as
the perturbation is sufficiently small such that P1 > 67 , or 21 + 2 + 3 + 47 >  87 . This
can be guaranteed by assuming max1n8 jnj < 17 . Therefore, the bubble in our example
is robust to any very symmetric perturbations in dividends if max1n8 jnj < 17 .
Similarly here we don’t necessarily require that d7 = d8 = 0. The result holds as long
as d7 = d8, which implies P2 (!7) = P2 (!8).
3.5 A Robust Bubble with Continuous States
3.5.1 Exogenous Setting
There are 2 agents (Ellen and Frank), 3 periods (1, 2, and 3) and continua of states

 =

b; e
B
 ; f
B
 ; e
G
1; e
G
2; e
G
3; f
G
1; f
G
2; f
G
3j;  2 [0; 1]
	
. Only 2 assets exist in the
market: one is money and the other is called a risky asset. Each share of the risky asset
will pay a dividend of amount 1 at the end of period 3 if the state is either eG3 or fG3 for all
 2 [0; 1], and will pay nothing otherwise.
Each agent is endowed with mi units of money and 1 share of the risky asset at the
beginning of period 1. Agents can trade in each of periods 1, 2, and 3. At period 3, after
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the trade is made, the dividend is realized, and consumption takes place.
Ellen and Frank have common priors with probability density function  (!) = 1
9
for
all ! 2 
. It is easy to check that R


 (!) d! = 1.
Their marginal utility levels are given by the table below.
State b eB fB eG1 eG2 eG3 fG1 fG2 fG3
MUE (!)  
2 1+2 
p
1+4
2
p
1+4
 2 3 2 2 23
MUF (!) 
1+2 p1+4
2
p
1+4
2 2 2 23  2 3
Let Ellen’s period 1 information sets be
EB =

b; e
B

	
EG =

eG1; e
G
2; e
G
3
	
EBuyer =

fB ; f
G
1; f
G
2; f
G
3j;  2 [0; 1]
	
And Ellen’s period 2 informations sets are
E012 = fbg ; E022 =

eG1
	
; E032 =

fG1
	
EB2 =

eB
	
; EG2 =

eG2; e
G
3
	
EBuyer2 =

fB ; f
G
2; f
G
3j;  2 [0; 1]
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By symmetry, Frank’s period 1 information sets are
FB =

b; f
B

	
FG =

fG1; f
G
2; f
G
3
	
FBuyer =

eB ; e
G
1; e
G
2; e
G
3j;  2 [0; 1]
	
And Frank’s period 2 informations sets are
F 012 = fbg ; F 022 =

fG1
	
; F 032 =

eG1
	
FB2 =

fB
	
; FG2 =

fG2; f
G
3
	
FBuyer2 =

eB ; e
G
2; e
G
3j;  2 [0; 1]
	
At period 3, all the information becomes perfect.
3.5.2 An Equilibrium with a Bubble
We are interested in the equilibrium where there is a strong bubble. The equilibrium
can be decomposed into 3 cases according to which states of the world occur:
(1) Nature chooses . (this is the pooling case, where the buyer cannot distinguish
the bad seller identifed by  from the good seller identified by  =  1+
p
1+4
2
), the
equilibrium prices and trades are given in the following tables.
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State b eB fB
P1 (!) P1 () P1 () P1 ()
P2 (!) 0 P2 () P2 ()
P3 (!) 0 0 0
P1 () =
1 + 2 p1 + 4
2 (1 + )
; P2 () =
1 + 2 p1 + 4
2
;
P1 () = P
L
1 () ; P2 () = P
L
2 () where  =  + 2
8! 2 
; xE1 (!) = xF1 (!) = xE3 (!) = xF3 (!) = 0
State b eB fB
xE2 (!) 0  1 1
xF2 (!) 0 1  1
xE2 (!) + x
F
2 (!) 0 0 0
(2) Nature chooses  2
h
0;
p
5 1
2
i
(this is the pooling case, where the buyer cannot
distinguish the bad seller identifed by  =  + 2 from the good seller identified by ),
the equilibrium prices and trades are given in the following tables.
State eG1 eG2 eG3 fG1 fG2 fG3
P1 (!) P
L
1 () P
L
1 () P
L
1 () P
L
1 () P
L
1 () P
L
1 ()
P2 (!) 0 P
L
2 () P
L
2 () 0 P
L
2 () P
L
2 ()
P3 (!) 0 0 1 0 0 1
PL1 () =
2
1 +  + 2
; PL2 () =

1 + 
8! 2 
; xE1 (!) = xF1 (!) = xE3 (!) = xF3 (!) = 0
State eG1 eG2 eG3 fG1 fG2 fG3
xE2 (!) 0  1  1 0 1 1
xF2 (!) 0 1 1 0  1  1
xE2 (!) + x
F
2 (!) 0 0 0 0 0 0
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(3) Nature chooses  2 (
p
5 1
2
; 1] (in this case the good seller can identify himself), the
equilibrium prices and trades are given in the following tables.
State eG1 eG2 eG3 fG1 fG2 fG3
P1 (!) P
H
1 () P
H
1 () P
H
1 () P
H
1 () P
H
1 () P
H
1 ()
P2 (!) 0 P
H
2 () P
H
2 () 0 P
H
2 () P
H
2 ()
P3 (!) 0 0 1 0 0 1
PH1 () =
22 (1 + )
(1 + 2)
 
1 +  + 2
 ; PH2 () = 21 + 2
8! 2 
; xE3 (!) = xF3 (!) = 0
State eG1 eG2 eG3 fG1 fG2 fG3
xE1 (!) 1 1 1  1  1  1
xF1 (!)  1  1  1 1 1 1
xE1 (!) + x
F
1 (!) 0 0 0 0 0 0
xE2 (!) 0  2  2 0 2 2
xF2 (!) 0 2 2 0  2  2
xE2 (!) + x
F
2 (!) 0 0 0 0 0 0
It is easy to see that in period 1 at state b, there is a strong bubble, since the price
P1 () =
1+2 p1+4
2(1+)
is positive while the dividend is zero.
The following analysis will make it more clear why the price and trade tables above
constitute an equilibrium. By symmetry, it suffices to only consider Ellen’s case.
In period 1 good Ellen’s confidence level is a function of the signal :
hG () =
ME
 
eG2; e
G
3

ME
 
eG1; e
G
2; e
G
3
 =  + 2
1 +  + 2
And bad Ellen’s confidence level is a function of the signal :
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hB () =
ME
 
eB

ME (b; eB )
=

1 + 
Thus, as long as  is not too big, the bad Ellen of type  might be able to pool with
some good Ellen of type , where  = + 2. Since  2 [0; 1], for pooling to be possible,
there must be some solution to the inequality + 2  1. And this together with condition
 2 [0; 1] gives the range of  for the pooling case:  2
h
0;
p
5 1
2
i
.
3.5.2.1 Pooling States
Let’s consider the pooling case first (The bad Ellen of type  poolING with some good
Ellen of type  2
h
0;
p
5 1
2
i
where  =  + 2).
Since at period 1 the bad Ellen of type  =  + 2 can pool with the good Ellen of
type , Frank in this case only knows he is in some state of set

eB ; e
G
1; e
G
2; e
G
3
	
where
 =  + 2. Since MF (e
B
 )(1+2)+MF (eG2 ;eG3)
MF (eB )(1+2)+MF (eG1 ;eG2 ;eG3)
34 = 
2+2+23
2+2+2+23
= +
2
1++2
= hG () =
hB (), where  =  + 2, Frank has the same expected price as the good Ellen of type 
and the bad Ellen of type  =  + 2. As a result, there is no trade at period 1. And from
the analysis we know the equilibrium prices must satisfy the following expressions:
PL1 () =
 + 2
1 +  + 2
PL2 ()
P1 () =

1 + 
P2 ()
P1 () = P
L
1 () ; P2 () = P
L
1 () where  =  + 2
At period 2, if the state is either b, eG1 , or fG1 , the equilibrium price is 0 since there is
34 Here 0 () = 1 + 2.
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no private information in that case. If the state is either eB , eG2 or eG3 , Frank cannot tell
difference between them, so he will form an "expected" price equal to
PL2 () =
MF
 
eG3

MF (eB ) (1 + 2) +MF
 
eG2; e
G
3
d  eG3 = 1 + 
or
P2 () =
MF
 
eG3

1p
1+4
MF (eB ) +MF
 
eG2; e
G
3

1p
1+4
d
 
eG3

35 =
1 + 2 p1 + 4
2
where
P2 () = P
L
2 () for  =  + 2
And in this case Ellen actually knows whether she is a good type or a bad type. If
she is a good type, her "expected" price would be ME(e
G
3)
ME(eG2 ;eG3)
d
 
eG3

= 
1+
. Since

1+
= PL2 (), the good Ellen does not feel bad to sell all of her asset to Frank. If she is a
bad type, her "expected" price would be 0, and she would be happy to sell. This situation
is shown in the trade table.
Given PL2 () = 1+ and P2 () =
1+2 p1+4
2
, we can get
3.5.2.2
PL1 () =
 + 2
1 +  + 2
PL2 () =
2
1 +  + 2
P1 () =

1 + 
P2 () =
1 + 2 p1 + 4
2 (1 + )
where
35 Here 0 () = 1p
1+4
.
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P1 () = P
L
1 () for  =  + 2
3.5.2.3 Nonpooling States
Now let’s consider the nonpooling case (the good seller of type  2 (
p
5 1
2
; 1] can
identify himself).
At period 1 the good Ellen of type  2 (
p
5 1
2
; 1] actually won’t be pooled with any
bad Ellen. And this refines Frank’s information sets. Now Frank knows he is in some
state of set

eG1; e
G
2; e
G
3
	
, rather than

eB ; e
G
1; e
G
2; e
G
3
	
in the previous case. Since
MF (eG2 ;eG3)
MF (eG1 ;eG2 ;eG3)
= 
2+23
2+2+23
= +2
2
2++22
< hG (),
36 Frank has a lower "expected" price
than the good Ellen of type . As a result, Ellen will be buying and Frank will be selling,
the equilibrium price will be determined from Ellen’s side. And from the analysis we
know the equilibrium prices must satisfy the following expression:
PH1 () =
 + 2
1 +  + 2
PH2 ()
At period 2, the price of asset for state eG1 crashes. For the remaining two states (eG2
and eG3), since
MF (eG3)
MF (eG2 ;eG3)
= 2
1+2
> 
1+
=
ME(eG3)
ME(eG2 ;eG3)
, the equilibrium price will be
determined from Frank’s side. And this price is equal to
PH2 () =
MF
 
eG3

MF
 
eG2; e
G
3
d  eG3 = 21 + 2
Given PH2 () = 21+2 , we can get
36 1
1+=2+2
> 1
1++2
) 2
2++22
> 1
1++2
) +22
2++22
< +
2
1++2
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3.5.2.4
PH1 () =
 + 2
1 +  + 2
PH2 () =
22 (1 + )
(1 + 2)
 
1 +  + 2

3.5.2.5 Remarks
It is worth noting that:
(1) PH2 () = 21+2 is increasing in , and for  2 (
p
5 1
2
; 1], PH2 () 2 (5 
p
5
5
; 2
3
].
(2) PL2 () = 1+ is increasing in , and for  2 [0;
p
5 1
2
], PL2 () 2 [0; 3 
p
5
2
]
(3) there is no overlapping range for PH2 () and PL2 (), which makes it impossible
that the good types to pool with each other. And our equilibrium depends on this fact
crucially.
(4) It makes sense that both PH2 and PL2 are increasing in  because the good type takes
the seller’s role at period 2.
(5) Both PH1 and PL1 are also increasing in .
3.6 Conclusions
This essay studies the robustness problem for models of rational bubbles based on
the Allen-Morris-Postlewaite (1993) framework. It is shown that with the discrete-state
assumption the bubbles are only robust to both strongly symmetric perturbations in beliefs
and very symmetric perturbations in dividends, but not robust to general perturbations.
However, it is possible to have a continous-state robust model of bubbles where prices
reveals the state information and small perturbations in states do not ruin the equilibrium
in general. This provides a new answer to the question: How robust can rational bubbles
be in a finite horizon model?
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Chapter 4 A Note on "Depth of Knowledge and the Effect of Higher Order
Uncertainty"
Morris, Shin and Postlewaite (1993) show an upper bound of asset prices in Rational
Expectations Equilibrium in a finite horizon model. This note strengthens their result by
providing a tighter upper bound and hence offers a better answer to the question: How
large can a bubble be in equilibrium?
4.1 Basic Setup
There are I ( 2) agents (i = 1; 2;    ; I), T ( 3) periods (t = 1; 2;    ; T ) and N
( 2) states of the world represented by ! 2 
.
Only 2 assets exist in the market: one riskless (money) and the other risky. There
is no discount between any two periods. Each share of the risky asset will only pay
a state-dependent nonnegative dividend denoted by d (!) at the end of period T . Let
d  max!2
 d (!) be the maximal value of dividends. Let qt (!) be the price of the risky
asset in state ! at period t.
Each agent i has a subjective belief about the probability distribution of the state,
denoted by i (!). 8i = 1; 2;    ; I;8! 2 
; i (!) > 0.
Each agent i’s information about the state at time t is represented by a partition of the
space 
. We denote by Pit (!) the partition member containing the state !. In other words,
Pit (!) consists of all the possible states agent i believes he might be in when the state ! is
realized at time t.
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4.2 Definitions and Notations
Definition 22 BpitF  f! 2 
ji [F jPit (!)]  pg is the set of states where event F is
believed with at least probability p by player i at time t.
Definition 23 BptF 
TI
i=1B
p
itF is the set of states where event F is believed with at
least probability p by every player at time t.
Definition 24 KitF  f! 2 
jPit (!)  Fg is the set of states where event F is known
to be true by player i at time t.
Definition 25 KtF 
TI
i=1KitF is the set of states where event F is known to be true
by every player at time t. We will say that the event F is mutual knowledge in the event
KtF at time t.
Definition 26 KmtF  Kt(Kt(  Kt(F )    )) is the set of states where everyone
knows that everyone knows that    that everyone knows F (to the mth order) at time
t. We will say that the event F ismth order mutual knowledge in the eventKmtF at time t.
Definition 27 CKtF  limm!1KmtF is the set of states where everyone knows that
everyone knows that    that everyone knows F (to any finite order) at time t. We will say
that the event F is common knowledge in the event CKtF at time t.
We say an event F is evident at time t if F  CKtF .
We say an event F is evident p-belief at time t if F  BptF .
4.3 New Result for Theorem 4.2 in MPS(1995)
Theorem 15 (Theorem 4.2 in MPS(1995)) If every player p-believes at time t that every
player will p-believe at time t+1 that every player will p-believe at time t+2 that ... every
player will p-believe at time T   1 that the asset is worthless, then the price of the asset at
time t is no more than (1  p) (T   t) d. That is
BptB
p
(t+1)   Bp(T 1)
T (p)  
t (p) ;where 
t (p) = f! 2 
jqt (!)  (1  p) (T   t) dg
Theorem 16 (Stronger Result for Theorem 4.2 in MPS(1995)) If every player p-believes
at time t that every player will p-believe at time t + 1 that every player will p-believe at
time t+ 2 that ... every player will p-believe at time T   1 that the asset is worthless, then
the price of the asset at time t is no more than  1  pT t d. That is
BptB
p
(t+1)   Bp(T 1)
T (p)  
t (p) ;where 
t (p) =

! 2 
jqt (!) 
 
1  pT t d	
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Proof. It suffices to show that for all t, Bpt
t+1 (p)  
t (p). Suppose ! 2 Bpt
t+1 (p).
Then each player i assigns at most probability 1   p to states not in 
t+1 (p), where
the price is at most d. At states in 
t+1 (p), the price is at most
 
1  pT t 1 d.
Thus, for each i, the expectation of the price in the next period is no more than
(1  p) d + p  1  pT t 1 d =  1  p+ p  pT t d =  1  pT t d. So
! 2 Bpt
t (p).
4.3.1 Remarks:
4.3.1.1 The Comparison with MPS (1995) Result
Let at =
 
1  pT t d. at can be viewed as an upper bound of the price at time t. Now
let us compare at with the value of the upper bound in Morris-Postlewaite-Shin (1995),
denoted by ct = min f(1  p) (T   t) ; 1g d.
We know the following mathematical facts:
(1) 1  pT t  1 with inequality being strict for p 2 (0; 1]; and
(2) 1   pT t  (1  p) (T   t) with inequality being strict for p 2 [0; 1) and
t < T   1. (To see why it is true, 1  pT t = (1  p)PT t 1=0 p  (1  p)PT t 1=0 1 =
(1  p) (T   t).)
Thus we have at  ct with inequality being strict for p 2 (0; 1) and t < T   1.
A complete comparison is shown by the following table:
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Table 4:1 The Comparison between at and ct
t < T   1 t = T   1
p = 0 at < ct at = ct
p 2 (0; 1) at < ct at = ct
p = 1 at = ct at = ct
Therefore we say at =
 
1  pT t d is a tighter upper bound of the bubble price than
ct = min f(1  p) (T   t) ; 1g d.
4.3.1.2 The Tightness of the Result
Actually the upper bound we have found is the best possbile upper bound of the price.
To see this, suppose fbtgTt=1 is any set of upper bounds that satisfies
BptB
p
(t+1)   Bp(T 1)
T (p)  
t (p) ;where 
t (p) = f! 2 
jqt (!)  btg .
It is obvious that bt  d8t = 1; 2;    ; T and bT = 0.
Let t = T  1, then we haveBp(T 1)
T (p)  
T 1 (p). This implies that for each i, the
expectation of the price in the next period is no more than pbT + (1  p) d = (1  p) d.
It is easy to construct an example where the expectation of the price at time T is
actually equal to (1  p) d (Consider the 2-period case where 9A  
 such that
A  ! 2 
ji 
T (p) jPi(T 1) (!) = p; 8i	 and d (!) =  0 if ! 2 Ad otherwise ). Therefore,
we must have bT 1  (1  p) d = aT 1.
Let t = T   2, similarly we must have pbT 1 + (1  p) d  bT 2. Since bT 1 
(1  p) d, this implies that bT 2  p (1  p) d + (1  p) d = (1 + p) (1  p) d =
(1  p2) d = aT 2.
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Let t = T   3, similarly we must have pbT 2 + (1  p) d  bT 3, which implies that
bT 3  p (1 + p) (1  p) d + (1  p) d = (1 + p+ p2) (1  p) d = (1  p3) d ==
aT 3.
Now if we suppose bt 
 
1  pT t d, then we can easily have bt 1   1  pT t+1 d.
By mathematical induction, we know
8t = 1; 2;    ; T; bt 
 
1  pT t d = at
4.3.1.3 The Single Player Case
The theorem actually works for every single player.
Theorem 17 (The Single Player Case) For given player i, if he p-believes at time t that
he will p-believe at time t+1 that he will p-believe at time t+2 that ... he will p-believe at
time T   1 that the asset is worthless, then the price of the asset at time t is no more than
(1  p) (T   t) d. That is
8i; BpitBpi(t+1)   Bpi(T 1)
T (p)  
t (p) ;where 
t (p) =

! 2 
jqt (!) 
 
1  pT t d	
Proof. It suffices to show that for all t, Bpit
t+1 (p)  
t (p). Suppose ! 2 Bpit
t+1 (p).
Then player i assigns at most probability 1   p to states not in 
t+1 (p), where the price
is at most d. At states in 
t+1 (p), the price is at most
 
1  pT t 1 d. Thus, player i’s
expectation of the price in the next period is no more than (1  p) d+p  1  pT t 1 d = 
1  p+ p  pT t d =  1  pT t d. So ! 2 Bpit
t (p).
4.4 New Result for Theorem 4.3 in MPS (1995)
Similarly, we can have a stronger result for Theorem 4.3 in MPS (1995).
Let 
T = f! 2 
jd (!) = 0g.
Theorem 18 (Theorem 4.3 in MPS(1995)) Suppose that, at state !, (i) it is kth order
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mutual knowledge at time t that the asset is worthless (! 2 [Kt]k 
T ),37 (ii) there exists
a subset of the state space, E, such that E is evident p-belief at every date following t
(E  Bpt0E, for all t0  t), (iii) E is true (! 2 E) and (iv) the depth of knowledge
conditional on E is less than or equal to k. Then the price of the asset at state ! at time t
is at most (1  p) (T   t) d.
Theorem 19 (Stronger Result for Theorem 4.3 in MPS(1995)) Suppose that, at state !,
(i) it is kth order mutual knowledge at time t that the asset is worthless (! 2 [Kt]k 
T ),
(ii) there exists a subset of the state space, E, such that E is evident p-belief at every date
following t (E  Bpt0E, for all t0  t), (iii) E is true (! 2 E) and (iv) the depth of knowl-
edge conditional on E is less than or equal to k. Then the price of the asset at state ! at
time t is at most
 
1  pT t d.
Proof. by (i) ! 2 [Kt]k 
T and (iii) ! 2 E, we have ! 2 [Kt]k 
T \ E.
It has been proved by mathematical induction in MPS (1995) (Lemma 3.1) that
[K]
k F \ E  [K(jE)]k F , for all events E;F and integers k
Given the above result, let F = 
T . We immediately get ! 2 [Kt(jE)]k 
T . This
means that it is kth order E conditional mutual knowledge at state ! at time t that the
asset is valueless.
It has also been proved in MPS (1995) (Theorem 2.1) that "if 
 has depth of knowledge
n and A 2 F , where F is a partition of 
 generated by the fundamentals, then for
all integers m > n, the event Km A is evident." Given this result, condition (iv) and
! 2 [Kt(jE)]k 
T imply that ! 2 CKt(jE)
T . This means that it is E conditional
common knowledge at state ! at time t that the asset is valueless. In particular, it must
be (T   t)th order E conditional mutual knowledge at state ! at time t that the asset is
37 There was a typo in the original paper that 
t should be 
T instead.
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valueless, that is, ! 2 [Kt(jE)]T t
T .
Since KsF  KtF and KtF  KtG for all s  t and events F  G, we know that
[Kt(jE)]T t
T  Kt(jE)K(t+1)(jE)   K(T 1)(jE)
T
Lemma 3.2 in MPS (1995) states that "if E is an evident p-belief event, then
K (F jE)  BpF ." Thus we have
Kt(jE)K(t+1)(jE)   K(T 1)(jE)
T  BptBp(t+1)   Bp(T 1)
T
By our new theorem 4.2, we have
BptB
p
(t+1)   Bp(T 1)
T (p)  
t (p) ;where 
t (p) =

! 2 
jqt (!) 
 
1  pT t d	
Since 
T (p) = 
T = f! 2 
jd (!) = 0g, we have ! 2 
t (p). This means that the
price of the asset at state ! at time t is at most
 
1  pT t d.
4.5 Conclusion
This note provides a new answer to the following specific question: What is a good
upper bound of the prices of an asset in an equilbirium in a finite horizon model?
Compared with the upper bound found in Morris, Shin and Postlewaite (1993), the
one shown in this note is smaller and actually tight. This result helps to improve our
understanding of the size of rational bubbles. For future research, It would be nice and
worthwhile to figure out whether a strong bubble, defined in Allen, Morris and Postlewaite
(1993), with the price exactly equal to the upper bound, can exist in equilibrium or not.
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